Suchbegriff: reli
Treffer: 333

16 - Johann Huart's Prüfung der Köpfe zu den Wissenschaften /

Wenn übrigens Huarte auf der 88. Seite dieses Werks behauptet, daß es nur den gros sen und erfindenden Genies erlaubt seyn sollte, Bücher zu schreiben, so muß er sich ohne Zweifel selbst für ein solches gehalten haben. Sollte man ihn nun nach seinen eignen Grund sätzen beschreiben, so würde man von ihm sa gen müssen: er ist kühn, er verfährt nie nach den gemeinen Meynungen, er beurtheilt und treibt alles auf eine besondere Art, er entdeckt alle seine Gedanken frey, und ist sich selbst sein eigner Führer. Man weiß aber wohl, daß solche Geister auch auf unzählige Para doxa verfallen; und der billige Leser wird sich deren eine ziemliche Anzahl auch hier anzutref fen, nicht wundern. Man überlege das Jahrhundert des Verfassers, man überlege seine Religion, so wird man auch von seinen Jrthümern nicht anders als gut urtheilen können. Mit den allzugroben aber, welche so beschaffen sind, daß sie bey der itzt weit erleuchtetern Zeit gleich in die Augen fallen, und daher der Kürze wegen hier übergangen werden, wird man Mitleiden haben. Jch vergleiche ihn übrigens mit einem muthigen

Pferde, das niemals mehr Feuer aus den Steinen schlägt, als wenn es stolpert.


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Among the manifold theological enquiries which occurred to him as deserving his most serious examination; he chused to begin with the grand fundamen tal one concerning the being, perfections, and provi dence of God. The reverend Dr. Clark's learned and ingenious book on this subject, published a short time before, fell into his hands. Tho'he most heartily approved of all the Doctor's conclusions, and had the highest sense of his singular abilities and virtues, yet after the most serious and attentive consideration of his arguments, he did not find that conviction from them which he wished and expected. In order to procure more satisfaction on this subject, and particularly with regard to the force and solidity of the arguments a priori (as they are commonly called) he wrote a let ter to him, about the year 1717, urging his objections, and desiring a further explication. Whether the Doctor returned any answer to this letter does not ap pear from Dr. Hutcheson's papers. After all the enquiry he could make, he still continued extremely doubtful of the justness and force of all the metaphysical arguments, by which many have endeavoured to demonstrate the existence, unity, and perfections of PREFACE.v the Deity. He not only thought that these kind of arguments were not adapted to the capacity of the bulk of mankind, but even that they could afford no solid and permanent conviction to the learned themselves. It was his opinion in this early part of his life, and he never saw cause to alter it, that as some subjects from their nature are capable of a demonstrative evidence, so others admit only of a probable one; and that to seek demonstration where probability can only be obtained is almost as unreasonable as to demand to see sounds or hear colours. Besides he was persuaded that attempts to demonstration on such subjects as are incapable of it were of very dangerous consequence to the interests of truth and religion: because such attempts instead of conducting us to the absolute cer tainty proposed, leave the mind in such a state ofdoubt and uncertainty as leads to absolute scepticism: for if once we refuse to rest in that kind of evidence, which the nature of the subject only admits of, and go on in pursuit of the highest kind, strict demonstration, we immediately conclude there is no evidence, because we do not meet with that kind of it which we expected: and thus the mind remains in a state of vi PREFACE. absolute uncertainty, imagining there is no evidence, when all that the nature of the case admits of is laid before it, and enough to satisfy every one whose un derstanding is not disordered with an unnatural thirstfor scientifical knowledge on all subjects alike. This opinion of the various degrees of evidence adapted to various subjects first led Dr. Hutcheson to treat mo rals as a matter of fact, and not as founded on the abstract relations of things. But of this more particularly hereafter.


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But Dr. Hutcheson's character, as a man of parts and learning, does not depend merely on the peculi arities of a scheme of morals. His knowledge was by no means confined to his own system: that he was well acquainted with the writings both of the anci ents and moderns relative to morality, religion, and government will appear evident to every one who per- xx PREFACE. uses the following work. Nor did the study of morals, even in this extensive view, engross his whole time and attention. An ardent love of knowledge was natural to him. He loved truth, and sought after it with impartiality and constancy. His apprehension was quick and his memory strong: he was not only patient of thought and enquiry, but delighted in it. His mind was never subject to that languor which frequently interrupts the studies of worthy men: his faculties were always at his command and ready for exercise. A mind endowed and disposed in such a manner, and employed in study for a long course of years, must have been furnished with a large compass of knowledge.


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A remarkable degree of a rational enthusiasm for the interests of learning, liberty, religion,virtue, and human happiness, which animated him at all times, was a distinguishing part of his character: he was visibly moved by some of these noble principles in whatever he said or did. They had such an ascendency over him as gave a peculiar cast to his whole conversation and behaviour, and formed in him a public spirit of a very extensive kind. Public spirit in him was not a vague and undetermined kind of ardor, for somethingunknown or not distinctly understood; but it was an enlightened and universal zeal for every branch of human happiness, and the means of promoting it. His love of valuable knowledge, his unabating activity in pursuing it and spreading a taste for it, fitted him, in a PREFACE.xxvii very singular manner, for that station which Providence had assigned him. And perhaps very few men, even in similar stations, have discovered equal zeal, or had equal success, in promoting a taste for true literature: but his zeal was not confined to what peculiarly belonged to his own profession, but extended to every thing that could contribute to the improvement of human life. When he spoke, you would have imagined that he had been employed in almost all the dif ferent stations in society, so clearly did he appear to understand the interests of each, and such an earnest desire did he express for promoting them. His benevolent heart took great delight in planning schemes for rectifying something amiss, or improving something already right, in the different orders and ranks of mankind. These schemes were not airy and romantic, but such as were practicable, and might have deserved the attention of those whose power and influence in society could have enabled them to carry them into execution. This warm zeal for public good appeared uppermost in his thoughts not only in his more serious, but also in his gayer hours. But while he abounded in projects for the interests of others, none xxviii PREFACE. ever heard of one which centered in himself. It has already been observed, that in the earlier part of life, when the taste for external enjoyments is commonly strongest, he did not listen to proposals which offered prospects of rising to wealth and preferment: in a more advanced age, but when he was still in such a vigorous state of health, as he might have hoped for many years longer of life, he had offers made of removing him to the University of Edinburgh, to be Professor of Moral Philosophy there, which might have been a more lucrative place to him, and given him better opportunities of forming connections with people of the first rank and distinction in this country, but he was contented with his present situation, and discouraged all attempts to change it.


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He had a full persuasion and warm sense of the great truths of natural and revealedreligion, and of the im portance of just and rational devotion to the happi xxx PREFACE.ness of human life, and to the stability and purity of a virtuous character. The power of devout sentiments over his mind appeared in his conversation: in his public prelections he frequently took occasion from any hints which his subject afforded him, as well as when it was the direct subject itself, to run out at great length, and with great ardor, on the reasonableness and advantages of habitual regards to God, and of referring all our talents, virtues, and enjoyments to his bounty. Such habitual references appeared to him the surest means of checking those emotions of pride, vain complacency, and self-applause, which are apt to spring up in the minds of those, who do not seriously and frequently reflect, that they did not make themselves to differ from others, and that they have nothing but what they received. Such sentiments deeply rooted in the mind, he looked upon as the proper foundation of that simplicity of heart and life, which is the highest perfection of a virtuous character.


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Such abilities, such dispositions, and such stores of knowledge, as have been mentioned, accompanied with a happy talent of speaking with ease, with propriety and spirit, rendered him one of the most masterly and PREFACE.xxxi engaging teachers that has appeared in our age. Hehad a great fund of natural eloquence and a persuasive manner: he attended indeed much more to sense than expression, and yet his expression was good: he was master of that precision and accuracy of languagewhich is necessary in philosophical enquiries. But he did not look upon it as his duty, either in his prelec tions, or in his writings upon moral and religious subjects, to keep up strictly at all times to the character of the didactive teacher, by confining himself to all the precision requisite in accurate explication and strict argument. He apprehended that he was answering the design of his office as effectually, when he dwelt in a more diffusive manner upon such moral conside rations as are suited to touch the heart, and excite a relish for virtue, as when explaining or establishing any doctrine, even of real importance, with the most philosophical exactness: he regarded the culture of the heart as a main end of all moral instruction: he kept it habitually in view, and he was extremely well qualified for succeeding in it, so far as human means can go: he had an uncommon vivacity of thought and sensibility of temper, which rendered him quickly suscep- xxxii PREFACE. tible of the warmest emotions upon the great subjects of morals and religion: this gave a pleasant unction to his discourses, which commanded the attention of the students, and at the same time left strong impressions upon their minds: he filled their hearts with a new and higher kind of pleasure than they had any experience of before, when he opened to their view, in his animated manner, large fields of science of which hitherto they had no conception: when, for instance, he pointed out to his pupils, in his lectures on Natu ral Theology, the numberless evidences of wonderful art and kind design in the structure of particular things, and the still more astonishing evidences of the wisest contrivance, and of the most benign intention, in the whole material system considered as one thing, it is easy to conceive that their tender minds, warm with the love of knowledge, would be greatly struck. Such views of nature were new discoveries to them, which filled them with delight and astonishment, and gave them at the same time the most joyful and satisfying conviction of the being and perfections of the great Author of all. In like manner, when he led them from the view of the external world to the contemplation of PREFACE.xxxiii the internal one, the soul of man, and shewed them like instances of Divine wisdom and benignity in the contrivance of its moral constitution, they were filled with fresh delight and wonder, and discerned new and encreasing proofs of the glorious perfections of the Father of our spirits. And when he described the several virtues exercised in real life, as beautiful in themselves, as the noblest employment of our rational and moral powers, as the only sources of true dig nity and happiness to individuals and to communities, they were charmed with the lovely forms, and panted to be what they beheld. The pleasure springing from the light of truth and beauty of virtue breaking in upon ingenious and well-disposed minds, excited such a keen desire of knowledge, and such an ardor of pursuing it, as suspended for a time those impulses of youthful passions which are apt to hurry young men away, in that period of life. But that it may not be imagined these strong effects are entirely to be ascribed to the charms of novelty, it deserves to be taken notice of, that students advanced in years and knowledge chused to attend his lectures on Moral Philosophy, for four, five, or six years together, still finding xxxiv PREFACE. fresh entertainment, tho' the subject in the main was the same every season.


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Besides his constant lectures five days of the week, on Natural Religion, Morals, Jurisprudence, and Government, he had another lecture three days of the week, in which some of the finest writers of antiquity, both Greek and Latin, on the subject of Morals, were interpreted, and the language as well as the sentiment explained in a very masterly manner.


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A Master, of such talents, such assiduity in the duties of his office, with the accomplishments of the gentleman, and fond of well-disposed youth, entering into their concerns, encouraging and befriending them on all occasions, could not fail to gain their esteem and affections in a very high degree. This gave him a great influence over them, which he employed to the excellent purposes of stamping virtuous impressions upon their hearts, and awakening in them a taste for literature, fine arts, and every thing that is ornamental or useful to human life. And he had remarkable success in reviving the study of ancient literature, particularly the Greek, which had been much neglected in the University before his time: he spread such an ar dor for knowledge, and such a spirit of enquiry every where around him, that the conversation of the students at their social walks and visits turned with great keenness upon subjects of learning and taste, and contributed greatly to animate and carry them forward in the most valuable pursuits. He did not confine his attention to the pupils immediately under his care, but laid xxxviii PREFACE. himself out to be useful to the students in all the different faculties, whenever any opportunity offered: andhe was especially solicitous to be serviceable to the students of divinity, endeavouring, among other im portantinstructions, to give them just notions of the main design of preaching. High speculations on disputable points, either of Theology or Philosophy, he looked upon as altogether improper for the pulpit, at least on all ordinary occasions. He particularly insisted upon the uselessness and impropriety of handling in the pul pit such speculative questions, as, whether human nature is capable of disinterested affections, whether the original of duty or moral obligation is from natural conscience, or moral sense, from law, or from rational views of interest, and such like enquiries. Tho' such disquisitions might be proper and even necessary in a school of philosophy*, yet in his view of things

* According to our Author's scheme it is only vindicating the Divine Wisdom and Goodness, manisested in the con stitution of our nature, to assert the existence and binding authority of the moral sense; because whatever other obliga tions we may be under, this internal onewill co-operate with them, when the mind perceives them, and will exercise its authority without them, when thro' a variety of causes we may be hindered from attending to them. Is the law of God duely promulgated the supreme obligation on all intelligent beings in this view of obligation,the internal law will co-operate with theexternal one, when we are attentive to itsauthority; and when we are not, it will be a rule of action, in some degree at least,without it. Besides it may be observed, that if the obligation of the moral sense be admitted to be a real one, men of the most sceptical turn of mind must be considered as remaining under its authority whenthey have set themselves at liberty from allother ties. Let us suppose a person so unhappy as not to believe that there is a God, or a future state of rewards and punishments, or that it is his interest upon the whole in this life to act the virtuous part; even such a person is still under the power of the internal sentiment, that one thing is right and another wrong. If he acts contrary to it he violates a known obligation, and must be conscious that he deservespunishment, and that it awaits him, if there is a judge and punisher. If we suppose that the sense of right and wrong is entirely erazed, then on our Author's scheme, as well as that of others, he is still accountable at least for the previous steps he had taken to bring him self in to this state of total insensibility as to all moralperceptions and views.

PREFACE.xxxix they did not fall within the province of the preacher, whose office is not to explain the principles of the human mind, but to address himself to them, and set them in motion: besides, as to the philosophical question concerning moral obligation, all the different ways of explaining it conspire to press the same virtuous course of action, which is the main thing the sacred orator should be concerned about. The general plan of preaching which he recommended was to this purpose: As mankind are weak, ignorant, guilty creatures, altogether insufficient for their own happiness, and every moment exposed to many unavoidable calamities, let them be called upon to reflect upon themselves as such, and let these doctrines of natural and revealed religion, which will impart consolation to them under these humbling views of themselves, be set before them in the strongest light: As they are apt to xl PREFACE. be seduced both from their duty and happiness by sel fish and sensual passions, let both the awful doctrines of religion, which may strike a dread and check the impulses of bad passions, and the joyful ones, which may excite and encourage to the practice of purity, sincerity, and all goodness, be displayed before them in all their force. And as they are prone to rest in the general knowledge of their duty, without seriously applying it to the government of their hearts and lives, let the religious instructor take care not to dwell too much upon such general topics as the beauty, excellency, and reasonableness of the Divine Laws, but commonly descend, in a minute and particular manner, to direct their conduct in all the relations and stations of life, even the lowest, and in the ordinary business and intercourses of it. And let all these things be done without laboured elevation of language, in that plain and simple manner which touches the heart, and brings things home to the conscience and imme diate feeling of every one.


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A Master, of such talents, such assiduity in the duties of his office, with the accomplishments of the gentleman, and fond of well-disposed youth, entering into their concerns, encouraging and befriending them on all occasions, could not fail to gain their esteem and affections in a very high degree. This gave him a great influence over them, which he employed to the excellent purposes of stamping virtuous impressions upon their hearts, and awakening in them a taste for literature, fine arts, and every thing that is ornamental or useful to human life. And he had remarkable success in reviving the study of ancient literature, particularly the Greek, which had been much neglected in the University before his time: he spread such an ar dor for knowledge, and such a spirit of enquiry every where around him, that the conversation of the students at their social walks and visits turned with great keenness upon subjects of learning and taste, and contributed greatly to animate and carry them forward in the most valuable pursuits. He did not confine his attention to the pupils immediately under his care, but laid xxxviii PREFACE. himself out to be useful to the students in all the different faculties, whenever any opportunity offered: andhe was especially solicitous to be serviceable to the students of divinity, endeavouring, among other im portantinstructions, to give them just notions of the main design of preaching. High speculations on disputable points, either of Theology or Philosophy, he looked upon as altogether improper for the pulpit, at least on all ordinary occasions. He particularly insisted upon the uselessness and impropriety of handling in the pul pit such speculative questions, as, whether human nature is capable of disinterested affections, whether the original of duty or moral obligation is from natural conscience, or moral sense, from law, or from rational views of interest, and such like enquiries. Tho' such disquisitions might be proper and even necessary in a school of philosophy*, yet in his view of things

* According to our Author's scheme it is only vindicating the Divine Wisdom and Goodness, manisested in the con stitution of our nature, to assert the existence and binding authority of the moral sense; because whatever other obliga tions we may be under, this internal onewill co-operate with them, when the mind perceives them, and will exercise its authority without them, when thro' a variety of causes we may be hindered from attending to them. Is the law of God duely promulgated the supreme obligation on all intelligent beings in this view of obligation,the internal law will co-operate with theexternal one, when we are attentive to itsauthority; and when we are not, it will be a rule of action, in some degree at least,without it. Besides it may be observed, that if the obligation of the moral sense be admitted to be a real one, men of the most sceptical turn of mind must be considered as remaining under its authority whenthey have set themselves at liberty from allother ties. Let us suppose a person so unhappy as not to believe that there is a God, or a future state of rewards and punishments, or that it is his interest upon the whole in this life to act the virtuous part; even such a person is still under the power of the internal sentiment, that one thing is right and another wrong. If he acts contrary to it he violates a known obligation, and must be conscious that he deservespunishment, and that it awaits him, if there is a judge and punisher. If we suppose that the sense of right and wrong is entirely erazed, then on our Author's scheme, as well as that of others, he is still accountable at least for the previous steps he had taken to bring him self in to this state of total insensibility as to all moralperceptions and views.

PREFACE.xxxix they did not fall within the province of the preacher, whose office is not to explain the principles of the human mind, but to address himself to them, and set them in motion: besides, as to the philosophical question concerning moral obligation, all the different ways of explaining it conspire to press the same virtuous course of action, which is the main thing the sacred orator should be concerned about. The general plan of preaching which he recommended was to this purpose: As mankind are weak, ignorant, guilty creatures, altogether insufficient for their own happiness, and every moment exposed to many unavoidable calamities, let them be called upon to reflect upon themselves as such, and let these doctrines of natural and revealed religion, which will impart consolation to them under these humbling views of themselves, be set before them in the strongest light: As they are apt to xl PREFACE. be seduced both from their duty and happiness by sel fish and sensual passions, let both the awful doctrines of religion, which may strike a dread and check the impulses of bad passions, and the joyful ones, which may excite and encourage to the practice of purity, sincerity, and all goodness, be displayed before them in all their force. And as they are prone to rest in the general knowledge of their duty, without seriously applying it to the government of their hearts and lives, let the religious instructor take care not to dwell too much upon such general topics as the beauty, excellency, and reasonableness of the Divine Laws, but commonly descend, in a minute and particular manner, to direct their conduct in all the relations and stations of life, even the lowest, and in the ordinary business and intercourses of it. And let all these things be done without laboured elevation of language, in that plain and simple manner which touches the heart, and brings things home to the conscience and imme diate feeling of every one.


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Some very good judges may think, and perhaps not without reason, that by any thing yet said, justice has not been done to Dr. Hutcheson's character as an author: „That he has been represented only as en quiring into the mind of man as a moral constitution, and asserting a distinct order of affections in it terminating ultimately on the good of others, and a Moral Sense, by which we instantaneously perceive a certain set of affections, characters, and actionsas good, and a contrary one as bad; all which is commonly done by that whole order of Philosophers who agree with him in admitting generous princi ples in human nature: whereas he justly deserves to be exhibited to the public in the light of an original, original in the most capital of all articles relative to the science of human nature and morality: PREFACE.xlv „for tho all the disciples of the generous philosophyassert, in the strongest manner, a distinct order of affections in our nature, having the happiness of others for their ultimate object, yet when the agent is put upon determining the most important measure of human conduct, Why am I to gratify this present desire? or why should I rather chuse to controul it in favour of another? the anser which this order of philosophers has given, is very different from that which is and must be given by Dr. Hutcheson: according to the former the agent is referred to the consideration of his personal happiness*(arising indeed from the prevalence of virtuous affections) as the determiner of his choice; taking it for granted, that there can be but one ultimate end of the agent's cool and deliberate pursuit, viz. his own highest interest or personal happiness: but Dr. Hutcheson's doctrine is far otherways; according to him, there are three calm determinations in our nature, namely, the calm desire of our own happiness, the calm desire of the happiness of other beings, and the calm desire of moral perfection,

* Shaft. Inq. from p. 77 to 174, and p. 69 middle sect. Lond. Ed.

xlvi PREFACE. „each of them alike ultimate; that betwixt the second and third determination there can scarce happen any opposition, but that it is quite otherwise betwixt the first and the other two, where an apparent opposition at least may often fall out, and in all such cases it is so far from being intended by the constitution of our nature, that the desire of private happiness should controul the other desires, that the Moral Sense never fails to dictate to the agent the voluntary sacrifice of the first, to either of the other two †: the whole is a question of fact, and every one must judge of it for himself: but the difference is the greatest imaginable, whether the desire of moral excellence, or the desire of private happiness is destined to be the supreme controuling principle according to the actual constitution of our na ture: and none of the Philosophers before our Author has ever hinted at such a representation of our nature as pleads for the former as the just account of the matter: nature has formed the union between the latter two of the three great ultimate de terminations of the human mind; but it is religion

† Book I. chap. iv. § 12. of this work.

PREFACE.xlvii „alone, according to him, that can render all the three invariably harmonious, and incapable of acting in different and opposite directions.“


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Let no man hence imagine that such actions flowing from false opinions about matters of fact, or about divine commands, are light matters, or small blemishes in a character. Where the error arises from no evil affection, or no considerable defect of the goodones, the action may be very excusable. But many of those errors in opinion which affect our devotion to ward the Deity, or our humanity toward our fellows, evidence very great defects in that love of moral excellence, in that just and amiable desire of knowing, reverencing, and confiding in it, which is requisite to a good character; or evidence great defects in humanity, at least in the more extensive and noble kinds of it. Where these principles are lively, they must excite men to great diligence and caution about their Diversity inApprobation. 97 duty and their practical conclusions: and consequent-Chap. 5.ly must lead them to just sentiments in the more important points, since sufficient evidence is afforded innature to the sincere and attentive. No man can havesufficient humanity of soul, and candour, who can believe that human sacrifices, or the persecution of his fellow-creatures about religious tenets which hurt not society, can be duties acceptable to God.


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4. Some perverse superstitions also, instilled by e- The original Desires experienced by all.105 ducation, cause groundless aversions to tenets andChap. 6.practices of the most innocent nature, by annexing to them notions of impiety, enmity to God, and obstinate wickedness of heart; while contrary tenets or practices, not a whit better, are made indications of piety, charity, holiness and zeal for the souls of men. Hence arises that rancour in the hearts of unwary zealots of all sorts against those who differ from them; and that persecuting spirit, with all the wrathful passions, which have been so long a reproach to human nature, and even to that religion which should inspire all love and meekness.


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A full persuasion of the excellence and importance of virtue above all other enjoyments, provided we have just notions of it, must always be for our interest.The opinion will stand the test of the strictest inquiry, as we shall shew hereafter; and the enjoyment is in our power. But disproportioned admirations of some sorts of virtue of a limited nature, and of some inferior moral forms, such as mere fortitude, zeal for truth, and for a particular system of religious tenets, while the nobler forms of goodness of more extensive good influence are overlooked, may lead men into very bad affections, and into horrid actions. No natural sense or desire is without its use, while our opinions are true: but when they are false, some of thebest affections or senses may be pernicious. Our moral sense and kind affections lead us to condemn the evil, to oppose their designs; nay to wish their destruction when they are conceived to be unalterably set upon the ruin of others better than themselves. These ve- experienced by all. 109 ry principles, along with the anger and indignationChap. 6.naturally arising against what appears evil, may lead us into a settled rancour and hatred against great bodies of mankind thus falsely represented as wicked, and make us appear to them, as they appear to us, maliciously set upon the destruction of others.


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Among these moral enjoyments, the joys of reli gion and devotion toward God well deserve to be particularly remarked, which in the class of moral enjoyments are the highest of all. But as these enjoyments are of a pretty different nature from the rest of the moral ones, they shall be considered apart hereafter, for reasons above-mentioned; and we shall shew their high importance to a stable and sublime happiness above all others.


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The unjust aversions from an erroneous conscience Danger of ill- grounded aversi- ons.and false notions of religion and virtue formed by superstition and wrong education, must lead into innumerable inconsistences. If men do not banish all reflection there must be grievous remorse and inward displeasure: a bigot, a persecutor, a robber, with a sort of conscience of duty to his party or his system 160 AComparison ofBook I. of opinions, opposing natural compassion and the plainest dictates of justice, can have but poor narrowsatisfactions. What are services to a party or causewhere we have no just persuasion of its worth, and inopposition to the interest of many others? What in pleasing a Demon of whose moral perfections we can have no just or consistent notion? The struggles must be terrible between all the principles of humanity and this false conscience. Reflection must ever raise torturing suspicions that all is wrong. All stable satisfac tion must be lost; or they must banish reason and inquiry.