31 - Johann Huart's Prüfung der Köpfe zu den Wissenschaften /
†) Es wäre sehr gut gewesen, wenn der Verf. sich etwas anders und deutlicher ausgedrückt hätte, weil man ihn sonst leicht beschuldigen könnte, daß er der Philosophie zu wenig zutraute, und sie für unfähig hielte, uns durch richtige Beweise von der Unsterblichkeit der Seele zu überzeugen; welches aber, wenn man das folgende zu Hülfe nimmt, seine Meynung nicht zu seyn scheint. Er will ohne Zweifel nur die Beweise der Vernunft und der Offenbarung mit einander vergleichen, und den letztern einen Vorzug einräumen. E.
32 - Johann Huart's Prüfung der Köpfe zu den Wissenschaften /
Nur eine einzige Schwierigkeit findet sich bey dem Gespräche des reichen Mannes mit dem Abraham, diese nämlich: wie es möglich gewesen sey, daß die Seele des Abrahams weit feinere Gründe hat vorbringen können, als die Seele des Reichen, da wir doch in dem Vorhergehenden behaupten, daß die vernünftigen Seelen, wenn sie den Körper verlassen haben, alle von gleicher Vollkommenheit und von gleicher Weisheit sind? Diesem Zweifel kann man auf zweyerley Art begegnen. Erstlich damit, daß die Weisheit und Fähigkeit, welche die Seele während ihres Aufenthalts imKörper erlangt hat, nach dem Tode des Menschen nicht verloren geht. Die Seele des Abrahams kam sehr weise und voller Geheimnisse und Offenbarungen, deren sie GOtt wegen derFreundschaft, die er gegen sie trug, gewürdiget hatte, aus diesem Leben: die Seele des Reichen aber mußte nothwendig sehr dumm aus dem Körper gekommen seyn, sowohl wegen der Sünde, welche die Ursache der Unwissenheit in dem Menschen ist, als wegen des Reichthums, dessen Wirkungen gleich das Gegentheil von den Wirkungen der Armuth sind; diese nämlich macht den Menschen, wie wir oben bewiesen haben, sinnreich, das gute Glück aber schwächt die Schärfe des Verstandes. †) Die zweyte Antwort kann nach unserer Lehre diese seyn: die Materie, worüber diese zwey Seelen stritten, gehört in die scholastischeTheologie; sie betraf nämlich die Fragen, ob in der HölleGnade Statt finden könne? ob es möglich sey, daßLazarus aus dem Ort der Seelenreinigung in die Hölle hinübergehen könne? und ob es zuträglich sey, daß man einen Todten in die Welt zurücksende, welcher die Lebenden von den Martern der Verdammten belehre? Alle diese Fragen, sage ich, gehören in die scholastische Theologie, und ihre Entscheidung hänget von dem Verstande ab, wie wir im Folgenden beweisen werden. Nichts aber ist dem Verstande mehr zuwider, als die unmässige Hitze, von welcher die Seele des Reichen nicht wenig gefoltert ward; dahingegen die Seele des Abrahams in einem sehr gemässigten Ort war; wo sie Trost und Erquickung genoß. War es also ein Wunder, daß sie weit besser dachte und schloß? Aus dem allen folgern wir nunmehr, daß die vernünftige Seele und der Teufel sich der körperlichen Beschaffenheiten zu ihren Verrichtungen bedienen; daß sie sich bey einigen von diesen Beschaffen
†) Der V. bemerkt nicht, daß er hier etwas behauptet, was seiner Meynung, nach welcher alle Seelen, wenn sie den Körper verlassen haben, von gleicher Vollkommenheit seyn sollen, gänzlich widerspricht. E.
heiten wohl befinden, andere aber durchaus nicht leiden können, und also an einigen Orten, ohne daß sie deswegen vergänglich sind, gern bleiben, einige aber durchaus fliehen.33 - Johann Huart's Prüfung der Köpfe zu den Wissenschaften /
Plato trift es viel schlechter, wenn er behauptet, *) die Dichtkunst sey keine menschlicheWissenschaft, sondern eine göttliche Offenbarung; weil die Dichter, wenn sie nicht ausser sich und voll von Gott wären, nichts recht besonders verfertigen oder sagen könnten. Er beweiset seine Meynung ferner daher, weil ein Mensch, wenn er den freyen Gebrauch seiner Vernunft hätte, nicht dichten könne. Doch Aristoteles**) tadelt ihn des erstern wegen, daß er die Dichtkunst für keine menschliche Wissenschaft, sondern für göttliche Offenbarungen hält; das andere aber räumet er ein, daß ein vernünftiger Mann, welcher den freyen Gebrauch seines Verstandes habe, kein Dichter seyn könne. Die Ursache hiervon ist diese, weil da, wo viel Verstand ist, sich nothwendig ein Mangel an Einbildungs
*)διαλ. Σοφις.
**) προβλ. τμημ. λ.
kraft äussern muß, welche der Dichtkunst besonders zugehört. Einen noch stärkern Beweis kann man daher nehmen, daß Sokrates, ob er schon die ganze Dichtkunst mit allen ihren Grundsätzen und Regeln studirt hatte, dennoch keinen Vers machen konnte; er, der durch den Ausspruch des Apollo für den weisesten Mann in der ganzen Welt erklärt wurde.34 - Johann Huart's Prüfung der Köpfe zu den Wissenschaften /
*) Da es aber GOtt wohlgefiel, der mich von meiner Mutterleibe hat ausgesondert und berufen durch seine Gnade, daß er seinen Sohnoffenbarte in mir. Gal. I. 15.
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Bey den Glaubensartickeln, welche die Kirche vorlegt, kann kein Fehler Statt finden. Denn da GOtt sahe, daß die Vernunft des Menschen so ungewiß sey, und sich so leicht hintergehen lasse, so konnte er es nicht zugeben, daß so hohe und wichtige Sachen ihrer eignen Bestimmung überlassen blieben. So oft sich also zwey oder drey auf eine feyerliche Art der Kirche gemäß versammeln, so ist er mitten unter ihnen, und billiget, als ihr Vorsitzer, das, was sie Gutes vorbringen, verwirft die Jrrthümer, undoffenbaret, was sich mit dem menschlichen Verstande nicht erreichen läßt. Die Probe also alles desienigen, was in Glaubenssachen vorgebracht wird, ist *) diese, daß man untersucht, ob es mit dem übereinkömmt, was die katholische Kirche davon sagt und festsetzt: denn wenn es diesem zuwider ist, so sind alle Gründe ohne Ausnahme unrichtig. Jn den übrigen Fragen aber, wo dem menschlichen Verstande seine Freyheit, zu urtheilen, gelassen wird, hat man die Art und Weise nicht ausfindig gemacht, wie man es versuchen könne, welche Beweise wirklich schliessen, und welche Wahrheiten der Verstand richtig verbunden habe. †) Alles kömmt
*) GOtt giebt den Weisen ihre Weisheit, und den Verständigen ihren Verstand. Dan. 2.
†) Der Verfasser muß hier nicht nicht an diemathematischen Wissenschaften gebacht haben, sonst würde er gewiß nicht wiederum den gewöhnlichen Fehler begangen, und einen Satz, der nur in sehr vielen Fällen wahr ist, als ganz allgemein angenommen haben. E.
dabey auf die gute Uebereinstimmung an; diese Uebereinstimmung aber ist ein sehr betrügliches Merkmal, weil nicht wenig Jrrthümer mehr Wahrscheinlichkeit haben, und mit mehr Beweisen unterstützt werden können, als die größten Wahrheiten.36 - /
Whatever corrections or improvements his scheme may be supposed to admit of, after longer observation and further examination into the frame and operations of our minds, one thing is certain that the result of his observations and reasonings must meet with entire approbation, as it places the highest virtue and excellence of a human character, where all sound Phi losophy and Divine Revelation has placed it, viz. In such habitual and prevailing exercise of all these good affections to God and man, as will restrain all other ap petites, passions, and affections within just bounds, and PREFACE.xvii carry us out uniformly to pursue that course of action, which will promote the happiness of mankind in the most extensive manner to which our power can reach *. And it must also be acknowledged, that our Author's doctrine, which asserts that we are laid under a real internal obligation, of a most sacred kind, from the very constitution of our nature†, to promote the good of mankind, tho' at the expence of sacrificing life itself and all its enjoyments, coincides, or at least is no way inconsistent with these precepts of Christianity, by which we are enjoined to lay down our lives for the
* Some seem to have mistaken our Author's doctrine so widely, as to imagine that he placed virtue in the mere sentiment or perception of moral beauty and deformity in affections and actions, which it is owned the worst of mankind may retain in a very considerable degree. Whereas he always places it in the exercise of these af fections and actions flowing from them which the moral faculty recommends and enjoins. Or in other words, virtue does not lye in the mere sentiment of approbation of certain affections and actions, but in acting agreeably to it.
† Some seem to have mistaken Dr. Hutcheson so far on this subject, as to imagine, that when he says we are laid under a most real and intimate obligation by the moral sense to act virtuously, he meant to assert that all other obligations from the consideration of the will of God, and the effects of his favour or displeasure in this
and in another world were superseded. Nothing could be farther from his thoughts; nor is it a consequence of his scheme. He was fully sensible of the importance and necessity of inforcing the practice of virtueupon mankind from all possible considerations, and especially from these awful ones of future rewards and punishments. If any one should say, that there is a natu ral sense of equity implanted in the human mind, which will operate in some degree even on those who know not that there is a God or a future state: it could not justly be concluded from thence, that such a person also maintained, that this natural sense of equity alone, was sufficient to ensure the uniform practice of justice, in all mankind, even when meeting with numberless strong temptations to depart from it. The application is so obvious, that it is needless to insist upon it.
xviii PREFACE. bretheren; while at the same time it gives us more just, more amiable and worthy ideas of human nature, as originally intended to be actuated by more disinterested principles, than these philosophers are willing to allow, who labour to reduce all the motions of the human mind to self-love at bottom, however much they may seem to be different from it at first appea rance. According to our Author's views of human nature, tho' these generous principles may be born down and over-powered in this corrupt state, by sensual and selfish passions, so as not to exert themselves with sufficient vigour, even when there is proper occasion for them; yet the intention of the Author of Nature is abundantly manifest from this important circumstance, that the moral sense is always so far true to its office, that it never fails to give the highest and warmest ap probation to every instance of truly disinterested virtue. The less suspicion there is of any view even to future fame in the behaviour of the martyr, the patriot, or hero, when he yields up his life in a worthy cause, so much louder and stronger is the applause of all spectators, and so far as any interested considerations are supposed to influence him, the approbation PREFACE.xix given to him is proportionably diminished: according to this representation of things, the soul of man, not only bears a resemblance of the Divine Intelligencein its rational faculties, but also of the Divine disinterested benignity in its social and public affections: and thus too our internal constitution, formed for pursuing the general good, beautifully tallies with the constitution of the universe: we see thro' the whole of Nature what admirable provision is made for carry ing on the general interests of all the species of living beings. So that it is quite agreeable to the analogy of Nature, that mankind, the highest order of creatures in this lower world, should be formed with dispositions to promote the general good of their species, and with a discernment that it is their duty to part with life itself, when a public interest requires it.37 - /
He had a full persuasion and warm sense of the great truths of natural and revealedreligion, and of the im portance of just and rational devotion to the happi xxx PREFACE.ness of human life, and to the stability and purity of a virtuous character. The power of devout sentiments over his mind appeared in his conversation: in his public prelections he frequently took occasion from any hints which his subject afforded him, as well as when it was the direct subject itself, to run out at great length, and with great ardor, on the reasonableness and advantages of habitual regards to God, and of referring all our talents, virtues, and enjoyments to his bounty. Such habitual references appeared to him the surest means of checking those emotions of pride, vain complacency, and self-applause, which are apt to spring up in the minds of those, who do not seriously and frequently reflect, that they did not make themselves to differ from others, and that they have nothing but what they received. Such sentiments deeply rooted in the mind, he looked upon as the proper foundation of that simplicity of heart and life, which is the highest perfection of a virtuous character.
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I. The intention of moral phil osophy is to Moral Philoso phy, what.direct men to that course of action which tends most effectually to promote their greatest hap piness and perfection; as far as it can be done by observations and conclusions discoverable from the consti tution of nature, without any aids of supernatural revelation: these maxims, or rules of conduct are therefore reputed as laws of nature, and the system or collection of them is called the Law of Nature.
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XII. As the order, grandeur, regular dispositions Religion natural.and motions, of the visible world, must soon affect the mind with admiration; as the several classes of animals and vegetables display in their whole frame exquisite mechanism, and regular structure, evidencing counsel, art, and contrivance for certain ends; men of genius and attention must soon discover some intelligent beings, one or more, presiding in all this comely order and magnificence. The great and the beautiful strikes the mind with veneration, and leads us to infer intelligence as residing in it, or directing it: a careful attention to the structure of our own natureand its powers leads to the same conclusion. Our feeling moral sentiments, our sense of goodness and virtue, as well as of art and design; our experience of 36 Mankind Social andReligious.Book I. some moral distribution within, by immediate happi ness or misery constantly attending virtue and vice, and of a like distribution generally obtaining even in external things by a natural tendency, must suggest thatthere is a moral government in the world: and as men are prone to communicate their knowledge, in ventions, conjectures, the notions of a Deity and providence must soon be diffused; and an easy exercise of reason would confirm the persuasion. Thus some de votion and piety would generally obtain, and therefore may justly be called natural to a rational system. An early revelation and tradition generally anticipated human invention in this matter: but these alone could scarce have diffused the belief so universally, without the aids of obvious reasons from strong ap pearances in Nature. Notions of Deity and some sort of worship have in fact as universally obtained among men, as living in society, the use of speech, or even propagating their kind; and thus may be counted as natural.
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X. But granting the mechanism to be universally good; yet if there appeared a prepollency of misery in this world, as some good men in their melancholy declamations have alledged, it would still leave some uneasy suspicions in the mind. This present state is the only fund of our evidence, independent of revelation, from which we conclude about other worlds, or future states. If misery is superior here, 'tis true that even in that case, the Deity might be perfectly good, as this misery of a part might be necessary for some superior good in the universe: but then we should not have full evidence for his goodness from the effects of it. The case however is otherways. Happiness is far superior to misery, even in this present world; and this compleats all the evidence we could expect, or require.
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V. The questions about vincible ignorance, and consciences erroneous, or doubtful, are only difficult through ambiguity of words. Conscience sometimes denotes the moral faculty itself: sometimes „the judgment of the understanding concerning the springs and effects of actions upon which the moralsenseapproves, or condemns them.“ And when we have got certain maxims and rules concerning the conduct which is virtuous, or vicious, and conceive them to be, as they truly are, the laws given to us by God the author of nature and of all our powers; or when we are persuaded that other divine laws are revealed to us in a different manner, then conscience may be defined to be „Our judgment concerning actions compared with the law.“
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9. When only equal good is done by persons of equal abilities, from whom more might reasonably have been expected, one acting from mere humanity, the other from additional motives of divine laws and promises proposed by revelation; we have better evidence of a good temper in the former. Our good actions should rise in proportion to the stronger motives proposed,* to shew an equally good temper.
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We should not censure providence on account of this imperfection, for reasons* mentioned above, any more than we censure it for our small bodily strength, or the shortness of our lives. If we use our powers and opportunities well, the condition of human life in this world will be in the main an agreeable and hap py state; and yet by divine revelation, or even by accurate reasonings of wise men, much may be discovered for the improvement of this life; and many fine institutions contrived, the reasons for which neither any one in the ruder nations, nor the populace in the more civilized, shall ever apprehend.
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If all these reasonings did not soon occur to men, 'tis probable they had not soon any need of the flesh of animals. When they needed it, their own sagacity might discover their right. And yet this right is so opposite to the natural compassion of the human heart that one cannot think an express grant of it by revelation was superfluous.*