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Whatever corrections or improvements his scheme may be supposed to admit of, after longer observation and further examination into the frame and operations of our minds, one thing is certain that the result of his observations and reasonings must meet with entire approbation, as it places the highest virtue and excellence of a human character, where all sound Phi losophy and Divine Revelation has placed it, viz. In such habitual and prevailing exercise of all these good affections to God and man, as will restrain all other ap petites, passions, and affections within just bounds, and PREFACE.xvii carry us out uniformly to pursue that course of action, which will promote the happiness of mankind in the most extensive manner to which our power can reach *. And it must also be acknowledged, that our Author's doctrine, which asserts that we are laid under a real internal obligation, of a most sacred kind, from the very constitution of our nature†, to promote the good of mankind, tho' at the expence of sacrificing life itself and all its enjoyments, coincides, or at least is no way inconsistent with these precepts of Christianity, by which we are enjoined to lay down our lives for the
* Some seem to have mistaken our Author's doctrine so widely, as to imagine that he placed virtue in the mere sentiment or perception of moral beauty and deformity in affections and actions, which it is owned the worst of mankind may retain in a very considerable degree. Whereas he always places it in the exercise of these af fections and actions flowing from them which the moral faculty recommends and enjoins. Or in other words, virtue does not lye in the mere sentiment of approbation of certain affections and actions, but in acting agreeably to it.
† Some seem to have mistaken Dr. Hutcheson so far on this subject, as to imagine, that when he says we are laid under a most real and intimate obligation by the moral sense to act virtuously, he meant to assert that all other obligations from the consideration of the will of God, and the effects of his favour or displeasure in this
and in another world were superseded. Nothing could be farther from his thoughts; nor is it a consequence of his scheme. He was fully sensible of the importance and necessity of inforcing the practice of virtueupon mankind from all possible considerations, and especially from these awful ones of future rewards and punishments. If any one should say, that there is a natu ral sense of equity implanted in the human mind, which will operate in some degree even on those who know not that there is a God or a future state: it could not justly be concluded from thence, that such a person also maintained, that this natural sense of equity alone, was sufficient to ensure the uniform practice of justice, in all mankind, even when meeting with numberless strong temptations to depart from it. The application is so obvious, that it is needless to insist upon it.
xviii PREFACE. bretheren; while at the same time it gives us more just, more amiable and worthy ideas of human nature, as originally intended to be actuated by more disinterested principles, than these philosophers are willing to allow, who labour to reduce all the motions of the human mind to self-love at bottom, however much they may seem to be different from it at first appea rance. According to our Author's views of human nature, tho' these generous principles may be born down and over-powered in this corrupt state, by sensual and selfish passions, so as not to exert themselves with sufficient vigour, even when there is proper occasion for them; yet the intention of the Author of Nature is abundantly manifest from this important circumstance, that the moral sense is always so far true to its office, that it never fails to give the highest and warmest ap probation to every instance of truly disinterested virtue. The less suspicion there is of any view even to future fame in the behaviour of the martyr, the patriot, or hero, when he yields up his life in a worthy cause, so much louder and stronger is the applause of all spectators, and so far as any interested considerations are supposed to influence him, the approbation PREFACE.xix given to him is proportionably diminished: according to this representation of things, the soul of man, not only bears a resemblance of the Divine Intelligencein its rational faculties, but also of the Divine disinterested benignity in its social and public affections: and thus too our internal constitution, formed for pursuing the general good, beautifully tallies with the constitution of the universe: we see thro' the whole of Nature what admirable provision is made for carry ing on the general interests of all the species of living beings. So that it is quite agreeable to the analogy of Nature, that mankind, the highest order of creatures in this lower world, should be formed with dispositions to promote the general good of their species, and with a discernment that it is their duty to part with life itself, when a public interest requires it.62 - /
But Dr. Hutcheson's character, as a man of parts and learning, does not depend merely on the peculi arities of a scheme of morals. His knowledge was by no means confined to his own system: that he was well acquainted with the writings both of the anci ents and moderns relative to morality, religion, and government will appear evident to every one who per- xx PREFACE. uses the following work. Nor did the study of morals, even in this extensive view, engross his whole time and attention. An ardent love of knowledge was natural to him. He loved truth, and sought after it with impartiality and constancy. His apprehension was quick and his memory strong: he was not only patient of thought and enquiry, but delighted in it. His mind was never subject to that languor which frequently interrupts the studies of worthy men: his faculties were always at his command and ready for exercise. A mind endowed and disposed in such a manner, and employed in study for a long course of years, must have been furnished with a large compass of knowledge.
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Such abilities, such dispositions, and such stores of knowledge, as have been mentioned, accompanied with a happy talent of speaking with ease, with propriety and spirit, rendered him one of the most masterly and PREFACE.xxxi engaging teachers that has appeared in our age. Hehad a great fund of natural eloquence and a persuasive manner: he attended indeed much more to sense than expression, and yet his expression was good: he was master of that precision and accuracy of languagewhich is necessary in philosophical enquiries. But he did not look upon it as his duty, either in his prelec tions, or in his writings upon moral and religious subjects, to keep up strictly at all times to the character of the didactive teacher, by confining himself to all the precision requisite in accurate explication and strict argument. He apprehended that he was answering the design of his office as effectually, when he dwelt in a more diffusive manner upon such moral conside rations as are suited to touch the heart, and excite a relish for virtue, as when explaining or establishing any doctrine, even of real importance, with the most philosophical exactness: he regarded the culture of the heart as a main end of all moral instruction: he kept it habitually in view, and he was extremely well qualified for succeeding in it, so far as human means can go: he had an uncommon vivacity of thought and sensibility of temper, which rendered him quickly suscep- xxxii PREFACE. tible of the warmest emotions upon the great subjects of morals and religion: this gave a pleasant unction to his discourses, which commanded the attention of the students, and at the same time left strong impressions upon their minds: he filled their hearts with a new and higher kind of pleasure than they had any experience of before, when he opened to their view, in his animated manner, large fields of science of which hitherto they had no conception: when, for instance, he pointed out to his pupils, in his lectures on Natu ral Theology, the numberless evidences of wonderful art and kind design in the structure of particular things, and the still more astonishing evidences of the wisest contrivance, and of the most benign intention, in the whole material system considered as one thing, it is easy to conceive that their tender minds, warm with the love of knowledge, would be greatly struck. Such views of nature were new discoveries to them, which filled them with delight and astonishment, and gave them at the same time the most joyful and satisfying conviction of the being and perfections of the great Author of all. In like manner, when he led them from the view of the external world to the contemplation of PREFACE.xxxiii the internal one, the soul of man, and shewed them like instances of Divine wisdom and benignity in the contrivance of its moral constitution, they were filled with fresh delight and wonder, and discerned new and encreasing proofs of the glorious perfections of the Father of our spirits. And when he described the several virtues exercised in real life, as beautiful in themselves, as the noblest employment of our rational and moral powers, as the only sources of true dig nity and happiness to individuals and to communities, they were charmed with the lovely forms, and panted to be what they beheld. The pleasure springing from the light of truth and beauty of virtue breaking in upon ingenious and well-disposed minds, excited such a keen desire of knowledge, and such an ardor of pursuing it, as suspended for a time those impulses of youthful passions which are apt to hurry young men away, in that period of life. But that it may not be imagined these strong effects are entirely to be ascribed to the charms of novelty, it deserves to be taken notice of, that students advanced in years and knowledge chused to attend his lectures on Moral Philosophy, for four, five, or six years together, still finding xxxiv PREFACE. fresh entertainment, tho' the subject in the main was the same every season.
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A Master, of such talents, such assiduity in the duties of his office, with the accomplishments of the gentleman, and fond of well-disposed youth, entering into their concerns, encouraging and befriending them on all occasions, could not fail to gain their esteem and affections in a very high degree. This gave him a great influence over them, which he employed to the excellent purposes of stamping virtuous impressions upon their hearts, and awakening in them a taste for literature, fine arts, and every thing that is ornamental or useful to human life. And he had remarkable success in reviving the study of ancient literature, particularly the Greek, which had been much neglected in the University before his time: he spread such an ar dor for knowledge, and such a spirit of enquiry every where around him, that the conversation of the students at their social walks and visits turned with great keenness upon subjects of learning and taste, and contributed greatly to animate and carry them forward in the most valuable pursuits. He did not confine his attention to the pupils immediately under his care, but laid xxxviii PREFACE. himself out to be useful to the students in all the different faculties, whenever any opportunity offered: andhe was especially solicitous to be serviceable to the students of divinity, endeavouring, among other im portantinstructions, to give them just notions of the main design of preaching. High speculations on disputable points, either of Theology or Philosophy, he looked upon as altogether improper for the pulpit, at least on all ordinary occasions. He particularly insisted upon the uselessness and impropriety of handling in the pul pit such speculative questions, as, whether human nature is capable of disinterested affections, whether the original of duty or moral obligation is from natural conscience, or moral sense, from law, or from rational views of interest, and such like enquiries. Tho' such disquisitions might be proper and even necessary in a school of philosophy*, yet in his view of things
* According to our Author's scheme it is only vindicating the Divine Wisdom and Goodness, manisested in the con stitution of our nature, to assert the existence and binding authority of the moral sense; because whatever other obliga tions we may be under, this internal onewill co-operate with them, when the mind perceives them, and will exercise its authority without them, when thro' a variety of causes we may be hindered from attending to them. Is the law of God duely promulgated the supreme obligation on all intelligent beings in this view of obligation,the internal law will co-operate with theexternal one, when we are attentive to itsauthority; and when we are not, it will be a rule of action, in some degree at least,without it. Besides it may be observed, that if the obligation of the moral sense be admitted to be a real one, men of the most sceptical turn of mind must be considered as remaining under its authority whenthey have set themselves at liberty from allother ties. Let us suppose a person so unhappy as not to believe that there is a God, or a future state of rewards and punishments, or that it is his interest upon the whole in this life to act the virtuous part; even such a person is still under the power of the internal sentiment, that one thing is right and another wrong. If he acts contrary to it he violates a known obligation, and must be conscious that he deservespunishment, and that it awaits him, if there is a judge and punisher. If we suppose that the sense of right and wrong is entirely erazed, then on our Author's scheme, as well as that of others, he is still accountable at least for the previous steps he had taken to bring him self in to this state of total insensibility as to all moralperceptions and views.
PREFACE.xxxix they did not fall within the province of the preacher, whose office is not to explain the principles of the human mind, but to address himself to them, and set them in motion: besides, as to the philosophical question concerning moral obligation, all the different ways of explaining it conspire to press the same virtuous course of action, which is the main thing the sacred orator should be concerned about. The general plan of preaching which he recommended was to this purpose: As mankind are weak, ignorant, guilty creatures, altogether insufficient for their own happiness, and every moment exposed to many unavoidable calamities, let them be called upon to reflect upon themselves as such, and let these doctrines of natural and revealed religion, which will impart consolation to them under these humbling views of themselves, be set before them in the strongest light: As they are apt to xl PREFACE. be seduced both from their duty and happiness by sel fish and sensual passions, let both the awful doctrines of religion, which may strike a dread and check the impulses of bad passions, and the joyful ones, which may excite and encourage to the practice of purity, sincerity, and all goodness, be displayed before them in all their force. And as they are prone to rest in the general knowledge of their duty, without seriously applying it to the government of their hearts and lives, let the religious instructor take care not to dwell too much upon such general topics as the beauty, excellency, and reasonableness of the Divine Laws, but commonly descend, in a minute and particular manner, to direct their conduct in all the relations and stations of life, even the lowest, and in the ordinary business and intercourses of it. And let all these things be done without laboured elevation of language, in that plain and simple manner which touches the heart, and brings things home to the conscience and imme diate feeling of every one.65 - /
* According to our Author's scheme it is only vindicating the Divine Wisdom and Goodness, manisested in the con stitution of our nature, to assert the existence and binding authority of the moral sense; because whatever other obliga tions we may be under, this internal onewill co-operate with them, when the mind perceives them, and will exercise its authority without them, when thro' a variety of causes we may be hindered from attending to them. Is the law of God duely promulgated the supreme obligation on all intelligent beings in this view of obligation,the internal law will co-operate with theexternal one, when we are attentive to itsauthority; and when we are not, it will be a rule of action, in some degree at least,without it. Besides it may be observed, that if the obligation of the moral sense be admitted to be a real one, men of the most sceptical turn of mind must be considered as remaining under its authority whenthey have set themselves at liberty from allother ties. Let us suppose a person so unhappy as not to believe that there is a God, or a future state of rewards and punishments, or that it is his interest upon the whole in this life to act the virtuous part; even such a person is still under the power of the internal sentiment, that one thing is right and another wrong. If he acts contrary to it he violates a known obligation, and must be conscious that he deservespunishment, and that it awaits him, if there is a judge and punisher. If we suppose that the sense of right and wrong is entirely erazed, then on our Author's scheme, as well as that of others, he is still accountable at least for the previous steps he had taken to bring him self in to this state of total insensibility as to all moralperceptions and views.66 - /
Some very good judges may think, and perhaps not without reason, that by any thing yet said, justice has not been done to Dr. Hutcheson's character as an author: „That he has been represented only as en quiring into the mind of man as a moral constitution, and asserting a distinct order of affections in it terminating ultimately on the good of others, and a Moral Sense, by which we instantaneously perceive a certain set of affections, characters, and actionsas good, and a contrary one as bad; all which is commonly done by that whole order of Philosophers who agree with him in admitting generous princi ples in human nature: whereas he justly deserves to be exhibited to the public in the light of an original, original in the most capital of all articles relative to the science of human nature and morality: PREFACE.xlv „for tho all the disciples of the generous philosophyassert, in the strongest manner, a distinct order of affections in our nature, having the happiness of others for their ultimate object, yet when the agent is put upon determining the most important measure of human conduct, Why am I to gratify this present desire? or why should I rather chuse to controul it in favour of another? the anser which this order of philosophers has given, is very different from that which is and must be given by Dr. Hutcheson: according to the former the agent is referred to the consideration of his personal happiness*(arising indeed from the prevalence of virtuous affections) as the determiner of his choice; taking it for granted, that there can be but one ultimate end of the agent's cool and deliberate pursuit, viz. his own highest interest or personal happiness: but Dr. Hutcheson's doctrine is far otherways; according to him, there are three calm determinations in our nature, namely, the calm desire of our own happiness, the calm desire of the happiness of other beings, and the calm desire of moral perfection,
* Shaft. Inq. from p. 77 to 174, and p. 69 middle sect. Lond. Ed.
xlvi PREFACE. „each of them alike ultimate; that betwixt the second and third determination there can scarce happen any opposition, but that it is quite otherwise betwixt the first and the other two, where an apparent opposition at least may often fall out, and in all such cases it is so far from being intended by the constitution of our nature, that the desire of private happiness should controul the other desires, that the Moral Sense never fails to dictate to the agent the voluntary sacrifice of the first, to either of the other two †: the whole is a question of fact, and every one must judge of it for himself: but the difference is the greatest imaginable, whether the desire of moral excellence, or the desire of private happiness is destined to be the supreme controuling principle according to the actual constitution of our na ture: and none of the Philosophers before our Author has ever hinted at such a representation of our nature as pleads for the former as the just account of the matter: nature has formed the union between the latter two of the three great ultimate de terminations of the human mind; but it is religion† Book I. chap. iv. § 12. of this work.
PREFACE.xlvii „alone, according to him, that can render all the three invariably harmonious, and incapable of acting in different and opposite directions.“67 - /
Some very good judges may think, and perhaps not without reason, that by any thing yet said, justice has not been done to Dr. Hutcheson's character as an author: „That he has been represented only as en quiring into the mind of man as a moral constitution, and asserting a distinct order of affections in it terminating ultimately on the good of others, and a Moral Sense, by which we instantaneously perceive a certain set of affections, characters, and actionsas good, and a contrary one as bad; all which is commonly done by that whole order of Philosophers who agree with him in admitting generous princi ples in human nature: whereas he justly deserves to be exhibited to the public in the light of an original, original in the most capital of all articles relative to the science of human nature and morality: PREFACE.xlv „for tho all the disciples of the generous philosophyassert, in the strongest manner, a distinct order of affections in our nature, having the happiness of others for their ultimate object, yet when the agent is put upon determining the most important measure of human conduct, Why am I to gratify this present desire? or why should I rather chuse to controul it in favour of another? the anser which this order of philosophers has given, is very different from that which is and must be given by Dr. Hutcheson: according to the former the agent is referred to the consideration of his personal happiness*(arising indeed from the prevalence of virtuous affections) as the determiner of his choice; taking it for granted, that there can be but one ultimate end of the agent's cool and deliberate pursuit, viz. his own highest interest or personal happiness: but Dr. Hutcheson's doctrine is far otherways; according to him, there are three calm determinations in our nature, namely, the calm desire of our own happiness, the calm desire of the happiness of other beings, and the calm desire of moral perfection,
* Shaft. Inq. from p. 77 to 174, and p. 69 middle sect. Lond. Ed.
xlvi PREFACE. „each of them alike ultimate; that betwixt the second and third determination there can scarce happen any opposition, but that it is quite otherwise betwixt the first and the other two, where an apparent opposition at least may often fall out, and in all such cases it is so far from being intended by the constitution of our nature, that the desire of private happiness should controul the other desires, that the Moral Sense never fails to dictate to the agent the voluntary sacrifice of the first, to either of the other two †: the whole is a question of fact, and every one must judge of it for himself: but the difference is the greatest imaginable, whether the desire of moral excellence, or the desire of private happiness is destined to be the supreme controuling principle according to the actual constitution of our na ture: and none of the Philosophers before our Author has ever hinted at such a representation of our nature as pleads for the former as the just account of the matter: nature has formed the union between the latter two of the three great ultimate de terminations of the human mind; but it is religion† Book I. chap. iv. § 12. of this work.
PREFACE.xlvii „alone, according to him, that can render all the three invariably harmonious, and incapable of acting in different and opposite directions.“68 - /
3. Certain compositions of notes are immediatly pleasant to the generality of men, which the artists can easily inform us of. The simpler pleasures arise from the concords; but an higher pleasure arises from such compositions as, in sound and time, imitate those modulations of the human voice, which indicate the several affections of the soul in important affairs. HencePlato † and Lycurgus ‡ observed a moral charac ter in musick, and looked upon it as of some conse quence in influencing the manners of a people.
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V. Action is constituted to mankind the grand source of their happiness by an higher power of perception than any yet mentioned; namely, that by which they receive the moral notions of actions and characters. Never was there any of the human species, except ideots, to whom all actions appeared indifferent. Moral differences of action are discerned by all, even when they consider no advantage or disadvantage to redound to themselves from them. As this moral sense is of high importance, it shall be more fully considered in a subsequent chapter. It may suffice at present to observe what we all feel, that a certain temper, aset of affections, and actions consequent on them, when we are conscious of them in ourselves, raise the most joyful sensations of approbation and inward satisfaction; and when the like are observed in others, we have a warm feeling of approbation, a sense of their excellence, and, in consequence of it, great good-will and zeal for their happiness. If we are conscious of contrary affections and actions, we feel an inward remorse, and dislike to ourselves; when we observe the like in others, we dislike and condemn their dispositions, reputing them base and odious.
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VII. Tho' it is by the moral sense that actions be- A sense of decen- cy and dignity.come of the greatest consequence to our happiness or misery; yet' tis plain the mind naturally perceives some other sorts of excellence in many powers of body and mind; must admire them, whether in ourselves or others;and must be pleased with certain exercises of them, with out conceiving them as moral virtues. We often usewords too promiscuously, and do not express distinctly the different feelings or sensations of the soul. Let us keep moral approbation for our sentiments of such dispositions, affections, and consequent actions, as we repute virtuous. We find this warm approbation a very different perception from the admiration or liking which we have for several other powers and dispositions; which are also relished by a sense of decency or dignity. This sense also is natural to us, but the perceptions very different from moral approbation. We not only know the use of such valuable powers, and of their exercise, to the person possessed of them; but 28 Sense ofDecency andDignity.Book I. have agreeable commotions of admiration and liking, and these in several degrees. Thus beauty, strength, swiftness, agility of body, are more decent and esteemable than a strong voracious stomach, or a delicate palate. The manly diversions of riding, or hunting, arebeheld with more pleasure and admiration than eating and drinking even in a moderate degree. A taste for these manly exercises is often valued; whereas pur suits of mere sensuality appear despicable even when they do not run into excess, and at best are only innocent. Nay there is something graceful, in the very shape gesture and motion, and something indecent and uncomely; abstracting from any indications of advantage discerned by the spectators.
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Thus according to the just observation of Ari Happiness of ac- tive beings is in action.stotle, „The chief happiness of active beings must arise from action; and that not from action of eve ry sort, but from that sort to which their nature is adapted, and which is recommended by nature.“ When we gratify the bodily appetites, there is an immediate sense of pleasure, such as the brutes enjoy, but no further satisfaction; no sense of dignity upon reflection, no good-liking of others for their being thus employed. There is an exercise of some other bodily powers which seems more manly and graceful. There is a manifest gradation; some fine tastes in the ingenious arts are still more agreeable; the exercise isdelightful; the works are pleasant to the spectator,and reputable to the artist. The exercise of the high er powers of the understanding, in discovery of truth,and just reasoning, is more esteemable, when the subjects are important. But the noblest of all are the vir tuous affections and actions, the objects of the moralsense.
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XIII. Notwithstanding that all these nobler powers The causes of vice.we mentioned are natural to us, the causes of that vice and depravity of manners we observe, are pretty obvious. Not to say any thing of causes not discover able by the light of nature, mankind spend several of their first years, where there is not a careful educati on, in the gratification of their sensual appetites, and in the exercise of some lower powers, which, by long indulgence, grow stronger: reflecting on moral notions,and the finer enjoyments, and comparing them with the lower, is a laborious exercise. The appetites and passions arise of themselves, when their objects occur, as they do frequently: the checking, examining, and ballancing them, is a work of difficulty. Prejudices andgroundless associations of ideas are very incident tomen of little attention. Our selfish passions early gain strength by indulgence. Hence the general tenor of human life is an incoherent mixture of many social, kind, innocent actions, and of many selfish, angry, sensual ones; as one or other of our natural dispositionshappens to be raised, and to be prevalent over others.
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V. Some plead that our most generous affections All kind affecti- ons are not from sympathy.are subordinate to private interest by means of sympa thy, which makes the pleasures and pains, the happiness or misery of others, the constant causes of pleasure or pain to ourselves. We rejoice in seeing others happy, nay in knowing that they are happy tho' at a distance. And in like manner we have pain or sorrow from their misery. To obtain this pleasure therefore and to avoid this pain, we have from self-love, say they, an inward desire of their happiness, undissembled, tho' subordinate to our desire of our own. Butthis sympathy can never account for all kind affections, tho' it is no doubt a natural principle and a beautiful part of our constitution. Where it operates alone, it is uniformly proportioned to the distress or suffering beheld or imagined without regard to other circumstances, whereas our generous affections are in very different degrees and proportions; we may have a weaker good-will to any person unknown; but how much stronger is the affection of gratitude, the lovewith esteem toward a worthy character or intimate friend, the parental affection? This sympathy, if it is the cause of all love, must be a very variable disposition, increasing upon benefits received, moral excellence observed, intimacies, and tyes of blood: for the inward 48 SomeAffections trulyDisinterested.Book I. good-will, the kind affection, is plainly increased by these causes.
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This may suffice to establish that important point, Some affections entirely disinte- rested.that our nature is susceptible of affections truly disinterested in the strictest sense, and not directly subordinated to self-love, or aiming at private interest of any kind. The tyes of blood, benefits received, moral excellence displayed, tho' we apprehend no advantage redounding to ourselves from it, are the natural causes of these particular kind affections; many of them arise unmerited; all terminate on the good of others; and all of them often operate in the soul when it has no 50 SomeAffections trulyDisinterested.Book I. views, or rational ground of hoping for any private advantage; nay when they are involving it in trouble and anxiety.