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But all these associations, habits, customs, or Vprejudices, recommend objects to our liking, or raise aversions to them, under the notion of some quality or species perceivable by the senses we are naturally endued with, nor can they raise any new ideas. No sentiments therefore of approbation or condemnation, no liking or disliking, are sufficiently explained by at tributing them to prejudice, custom, or education, orassociation of ideas; unless we can fully shew what these ideas or notions are, and to what sense they be- Conjugal andParental Affections. 33 long, under which these objects are approved or con-Chap. 2.demned, liked or disliked.
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XIII. Notwithstanding that all these nobler powers The causes of vice.we mentioned are natural to us, the causes of that vice and depravity of manners we observe, are pretty obvious. Not to say any thing of causes not discover able by the light of nature, mankind spend several of their first years, where there is not a careful educati on, in the gratification of their sensual appetites, and in the exercise of some lower powers, which, by long indulgence, grow stronger: reflecting on moral notions,and the finer enjoyments, and comparing them with the lower, is a laborious exercise. The appetites and passions arise of themselves, when their objects occur, as they do frequently: the checking, examining, and ballancing them, is a work of difficulty. Prejudices andgroundless associations of ideas are very incident tomen of little attention. Our selfish passions early gain strength by indulgence. Hence the general tenor of human life is an incoherent mixture of many social, kind, innocent actions, and of many selfish, angry, sensual ones; as one or other of our natural dispositionshappens to be raised, and to be prevalent over others.
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'Tis in vain here to alledge instruction, education, custom, or association of ideas as the original of moralapprobation. As these can give no new senses, let us examine what the opinion or what the notion is upon which we approve, and to what sense it belongs, whatever way the notion may have been conjoined, or whatever
* A compleat examination of these characters would call us off too much from the
present design; we must therefore refer to the illustrations on the moral sense.
58 TheSense ofMoral Goodness.Book I. have been the causes of our getting this opinion that such a quality is inherent in or connected with the action? and this will lead us to an original principle.34 - /
When the necessity of strict marriage-laws for the ascertaining to the fathers their own offspring was once observed, new reasons would appear for modest behaviour, and for creating an early habit of it in the animmediate Principle. 85education of both sexes. But, besides, there seem to beChap. 5.several natural dispositions and senses peculiarly relative to this affair, distinct from the general shame ofall immoderate selfishness, particularly that of mo desty, which begins at that period when the appetitewhich needs its controll arises, and seems to abate inold age along with the appetite.
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IV. Having a natural capacity for moral notions, This sense how affected by educa- tion.we may be ashamed of actions without knowing the true reasons why they are immoral. By education we may contract groundless prejudices, or opinions about the qualities perceivable by any of our senses, as if they were inherent in objects where they are not. Thus we are prejudiced against meats we never tasted: but we could not be prejudiced on account of savour, or under that notion, if we had not the natural sense. Thus it is always under some species recommended by the moral faculty that we praise or desire to be praised, tho' we frequently have very imperfect views of the tendencies of actions, and of the affections from which they proceeded.
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4. Some perverse superstitions also, instilled by e- The original Desires experienced by all.105 ducation, cause groundless aversions to tenets andChap. 6.practices of the most innocent nature, by annexing to them notions of impiety, enmity to God, and obstinate wickedness of heart; while contrary tenets or practices, not a whit better, are made indications of piety, charity, holiness and zeal for the souls of men. Hence arises that rancour in the hearts of unwary zealots of all sorts against those who differ from them; and that persecuting spirit, with all the wrathful passions, which have been so long a reproach to human nature, and even to that religion which should inspire all love and meekness.
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VI. As soon as one observes the affections of others Moral forms universally affect mankind.or reflects on his own, the moral qualities must affect the mind. No education, habit, false opinions, or even affectation itself can prevent it. A Lucretius, an Hobbes, a Bayle, cannot shake off sentiments of gratitude, praise, and admiration of some moral forms; and of censure and detestation of others. This sense may be a sure fund of inward enjoyment to those who obey its suggestions. Our own temper and actions may be constant sources of joy upon reflection. But where partial notions of virtue and justice are rashly entertained, without extensive views and true opinionsof the merit of persons and causes, the pursuit of some moral forms may occasion grievous distaste and remorse. False notions of virtue may be less lasting than other mistakes. Persons injured by them seldom fail to remonstrate; spectators not blinded by our passions and interest will shew their disgust. And thus our ill-grounded joy and self-approbation may soon give place to shame and remorse.
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II. Tho' the several original powers above-mention- The different tastes of men.ed are natural to all men, yet through habit, associated ideas, education, or opinion, some generally pursue enjoyments of one kind; and shew a disregard of others,which are highly valued by men of a different turn. Some are much given to sensuality; others to more ingenious pleasures; others pursue wealth and power; others moral and social enjoyments, and honour. Wealth and power have some few faithful votaries adoring them for themselves: but the more numerous worshipers adore them only as ministring spirits, or mediators with some superior divinities, as pleasure, honour, beneficence.
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Our nature is susceptible of such ardour toward they are capable of the greatest strength.moral and social enjoyments as generally to be able to surmount all other desires, and make men despise all 152 AComparison ofBook I. bodily pleasure or pain. We see instances not only among the civilized, or where notions of virtue are strengthened by a finer education, but even among rude barbarians and robbers. From a point of honour, from gratitude, from zeal to a clan, or resentment of wrongs done to it, they can joyfully embrace all hardships, and defy death and torments.
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The unjust aversions from an erroneous conscience Danger of ill- grounded aversi- ons.and false notions of religion and virtue formed by superstition and wrong education, must lead into innumerable inconsistences. If men do not banish all reflection there must be grievous remorse and inward displeasure: a bigot, a persecutor, a robber, with a sort of conscience of duty to his party or his system 160 AComparison ofBook I. of opinions, opposing natural compassion and the plainest dictates of justice, can have but poor narrowsatisfactions. What are services to a party or causewhere we have no just persuasion of its worth, and inopposition to the interest of many others? What in pleasing a Demon of whose moral perfections we can have no just or consistent notion? The struggles must be terrible between all the principles of humanity and this false conscience. Reflection must ever raise torturing suspicions that all is wrong. All stable satisfac tion must be lost; or they must banish reason and inquiry.
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The power of education is surprizing! this author in these justly admired books of politicks is a zealous asserter of liberty, and has seen the finest and most humane reasons for all the more equitable plans of civilpower. He lived in that singular century, in which Greece indeed produced more great and ingenious men than perhaps the world ever beheld at once: but had he lived to our times, he would have known, that this beloved country, for sixteen centuries, hath sel dom produced any thing eminent in virtue, polity, arts, or arms; while great genii were often arising in the nations he had adjudged to slavery and barbarity.
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The inconveniencies arising from property, which The faults in the schemes of community.Plato and Sir Thomas More endeavour to avoid by the schemes of community, are not so great as those which must ensue upon community; and most of them may be prevented where property is allowed with all its innocent pleasures, by a censorial power, and pro per laws about education, testaments, and succession. Plato* indeed consistently with his scheme of community takes away all knowlege of the particular tyes of blood as much as possible, and all the tender affections founded on them, at least among those of the highest order in his state. He is indeed unjustly charged with indulging any dissolute inclinations of those men: but it seems too arrogant in that fine genius to attempt an overturning the manifest constitution of the Creator, and to root out what is so deeply fixed in the human soul; vainly presuming to contrive something better than the God of nature has ordered. The more extensive affections will never give the generality of
* See book iii. c. 1.
324 HowProperty is acquired.Book II. men such ardors, nor give them such enjoyments, without particular affections, as are plainly necessary in our constitution to diligence and happiness. Leaving a place for all the particular bonds of nature, but keeping them in due subjection to the more noble affections, will answer better all the ends of polity and morals: and such schemes as his will never be found practicable among creatures of our constitution.43 - /
Von dieser Zeit an, wurde seine Bekantschaft in Jrrland fast von allen denjenigen gesucht, welche entweder wegen ihrer Würde, oder wegen ihrer Gelehrsamkeit in Ansehen standen. Der Erzbischof King, der Verfasser des Buchs de origine mali, hielt Hutcheson sehr hoch, und seine Freundschaft war für ihn in einer Begebenheit von grossem Nutzen, die ausserdem von verdrieslichen Folgen gewesen wäre, und ihn gänzlich außer Stand hätte setzen können, in seiner Stelle noch weiter nützlich zu seyn. Es wurden zween verschiedene Versuche ge macht, Hutcheson, vor dem erzbischöflichen Gerichte, zu verklagen, weil er sich unterstanden hätte, die Erziehungder Jugend zu übernehmen, ohne sich durch die Unter schrift der englischen Kirchenordnung und durch die Er laubnis vom Bischof, hierzu geschickt gemacht zu haben. Es wurde aber durch diese beyden Versuche nichts aus gerichtet, weil der Erzbischof den grössten Unwillen gegen diejenigen zu erkennen gab, welche so kühn gewesen wa ren, sie zu unternehmen. Er versicherte ihn zugleich, daß er nicht Ursache hätte, von dieser Seite einige Beun ruhigung zu befürchten, so lange es in seiner Gewalt stünde, es zu verhüten.
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Man mus dieses für keine unbillige Grau samkeit des Urhebers der Natur gegen die Men schen ansehen. Wir werden bald das Gegenmittel wider diese langwierige Schwachheit unsrer jün gern Jahre in der zärtlichen Zuneigung der Aeltern zubereitet finden; wir werden die Endursachen der selben in den verschiedenen Verbesserungen wahr nehmen, deren wir fähig sind. Die Mittel unse rer Erhaltung erfordern viel Mühe und Geschick lichkeit: wir sind verschiedener edler Vergnügungen fähig, die andern beseelten Geschöpfen unbekant sind, und in den nützlichen und angenehmen Kün sten ihren Grund haben, welche wir, ohne eine lange Erziehung, ohne vielen Unterricht, und ohne die Nachahmung anderer, nicht erlernen können. Wie viel Zeit haben wir nöthig, unsre Mutter sprache zu lernen? Wie viel Geschicklichkeit wird selbst zu den gemeinsten Künsten des Ackerbaues, oder anderer zur Wirthschaft gehörigen Verrichtun gen, erfordert? Ein Körper, mit voller Stär ke ausgerüstet, ohne eine Seele, die weder Künste noch Wissenschaften, noch gemeinnützige Fähigkeiten besässe, würde uns unbändig und un biegsam machen. Wir würden unsern Aeltern und Lehrmeistern eine Last seyn. Da wir also nö thig haben, unterwürfig zu bleiben: so haben wir nicht so zeitig die Kräfte haben sollen, uns von die sem nothwendigen und liebreichen Joche losmachen zu können.
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IIX. Ehe wir zu den Fähigkeiten des Wil lens fortgehen, wollen wir noch eine natürliche Bestimmung, die ausser unsrer Willkühr ist, an merken, nämlich, solche Vorstellungen, die zugleich vorgekommen sind, oder auf einmal einen starken Eindruck auf die Seele gemacht haben, neben einander zu stellen, oder zusammen zu knüpfen, so, daß immer einer die andre begleitet, wenn ein Ge genstand eine oder mehrere davon lebhaft macht. Gleichwie wir dieses in geringern Fällen wahrneh men: also erstreckt sich diese Erfahrung auch auf unsre Begriffe vom natürlichen und moralischen Guten oder Bösen. Wenn die Gewohnheit und die Meinung der Welt gewisse Handlungen oder Begebenheiten uns, eine Zeit lang, als gut oder böse vorgestellt hat: so wird es uns schwer, die Ver einbarung aufzuheben, ungeachtet vielleicht unsere Vernunft von dem Gegentheil überzeugt ist. Man hat also eine dunkle Einbildung von dem Anstän digen oder Unanständigen gewisser Handlungen; von dem Elend eines Zustands und von dem Glück eines andern; so wie man bey Kirchhöfen sich Ge spenster vorstellt. Obgleich viele Widerwärtigkei ten und Laster aus dieser Quelle entspringen: so Empfindungskräften. 81Zweyter Abschnitt. müssen mir<wir> doch gestehen, daß diese Bestimmung schlechterdings nothwendig sey. Ohne sie würde für uns das Gedächtnis, die Erinnerung, und selbst die Sprache einen geringen Nutzen haben. Wie mühsam würde es seyn, wenn wir bey jedem Wor te, das wir hören, oder zu sprechen verlangen, eine besondere Erinnerung nöthig hätten, um ausfindig zu machen, was für Worte und Begriffe, durch die Gewohnheit der Sprache, verbunden sind? Es würde eine eben so beschwerliche Arbeit seyn, als wenn wir eine verborgene Schrift, wozu wir einen Schlüssel gefunden, entziffern wollen. Ton und Begriffe sind mit einander so genau verknüpft, daß der eine allemal von dem andern begleitet wird. Wie geht es zu, daß wir uns erinnern? Wenn wir um eine vergangene Begebenheit gefragt werden: so wird der Zeit, oder des Orts, eines Nebenum stands, oder einer damals gegenwärtigen Person erwähnt; und diese bringen das ganze Gefolge der vergesellschafteten Begriffe mit sich. Man spricht von einer Streitigkeit; eine Person, die davon un terrichtet ist, findet, daß, ehe sie es noch will, die vornehmsten Schlüsse beyder Theile, sich ihrer Seele vorstellen. Dieser Fähigkeit mus man grössten Theils die Gewalt der Erziehung schuld geben, welche in unsrer Kindheit, viele Verknüpfungen der Begriffe hervorbringt. Wenige haben die Gedult, oder den Muth, zu untersuchen, ob dieselben, in der Natur, oder in der Schwachheit ihrer Anführer, gegrün det sind.