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Among the manifold theological enquiries which occurred to him as deserving his most serious examination; he chused to begin with the grand fundamen tal one concerning the being, perfections, and provi dence of God. The reverend Dr. Clark's learned and ingenious book on this subject, published a short time before, fell into his hands. Tho'he most heartily approved of all the Doctor's conclusions, and had the highest sense of his singular abilities and virtues, yet after the most serious and attentive consideration of his arguments, he did not find that conviction from them which he wished and expected. In order to procure more satisfaction on this subject, and particularly with regard to the force and solidity of the arguments a priori (as they are commonly called) he wrote a let ter to him, about the year 1717, urging his objections, and desiring a further explication. Whether the Doctor returned any answer to this letter does not ap pear from Dr. Hutcheson's papers. After all the enquiry he could make, he still continued extremely doubtful of the justness and force of all the metaphysical arguments, by which many have endeavoured to demonstrate the existence, unity, and perfections of PREFACE.v the Deity. He not only thought that these kind of arguments were not adapted to the capacity of the bulk of mankind, but even that they could afford no solid and permanent conviction to the learned themselves. It was his opinion in this early part of his life, and he never saw cause to alter it, that as some subjects from their nature are capable of a demonstrative evidence, so others admit only of a probable one; and that to seek demonstration where probability can only be obtained is almost as unreasonable as to demand to see sounds or hear colours. Besides he was persuaded that attempts to demonstration on such subjects as are incapable of it were of very dangerous consequence to the interests of truth and religion: because such attempts instead of conducting us to the absolute cer tainty proposed, leave the mind in such a state ofdoubt and uncertainty as leads to absolute scepticism: for if once we refuse to rest in that kind of evidence, which the nature of the subject only admits of, and go on in pursuit of the highest kind, strict demonstration, we immediately conclude there is no evidence, because we do not meet with that kind of it which we expected: and thus the mind remains in a state of vi PREFACE. absolute uncertainty, imagining there is no evidence, when all that the nature of the case admits of is laid before it, and enough to satisfy every one whose un derstanding is not disordered with an unnatural thirstfor scientifical knowledge on all subjects alike. This opinion of the various degrees of evidence adapted to various subjects first led Dr. Hutcheson to treat mo rals as a matter of fact, and not as founded on the abstract relations of things. But of this more particularly hereafter.

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These two powers of perception, sensation and consciousness, introduce into the mind all its materials of knowledge. All our primary and direct ideas or notions are derived from one or other of these sources. But the mind never rests in bare perception; it compares the ideas received, discerns their relations, marks the changes made in objects by our own action or that of The differentPowers of theWill. 7 others; it inquires into the natures, proportions, cau Chap. 1.ses, effects, antecedents, consequents, of every thing, when it is not diverted by some importunate appetite. These powers of judging and reasoning are more known and better examined by all philosophers than any other, and therefore we pass them over. All these se veral powers, of external sensation, consciousness, judging, and reasoning, are commonly called the acts of the understanding.

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XIII. But as the selfish principles are very strong, and by custom, by early and frequent indulgences, and other causes, are raised in the greatest part of men above their due proportion, while the generous principles are little cultivated, and the moral sense often asleep; our powers of reasoning and comparing the several enjoyments which our nature is capable of, that wemay discover which of them are of greatest consequenceto our happiness; our capacity, by reasoning, of arri ving to the knowledge of a Governing Mind presiding in this world, and of a moral administration, are of the highest consequence and necessity to preserve our affections in a just order, and to corroborate our moral faculty: as by such reasoning and reflection we may discover a perfect consistency of all the generous motions of the soul with private interest, and find out a certain tenor of life and action the most effectually sub- The Sense of Honour a Natural Principle. 79 servient to both these determinations. This shall beChap. 5.the subject of some following chapters, after we shall have subjoined some further confirmation of these moral principles, from the sense of honour; and observed the universality of both, and how far they seem uniform principles in our species.

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To direct us in this conduct 'tis necessary to premise some distinct account in what manner we have power over our several affections and desires, and how far any meditations or self-discipline may affect our Desires andPassions. 101 very perceptions of good and evil, of happiness or mi Chap. 6.sery, in the several objects.

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Superior beings by diviner faculties and fuller know-Chap. 7.ledge may, without experience of all sorts, immedi- What men are the best judges.ately discern what are the noblest. They may have some intuitive knowledge of perfection, and some standard of it, which may make the experience of some lower sorts useless to them. But of mankind these certainly are the best judges who have full experience, with their tastes or senses and appetites in a natural vigorous state. Now it never was alledged that social affections, the admiration of moral excellence, the desire of esteem, with their attendant and guardian tem perance, the pursuits of knowledge, or a natural activity, impaired any sense or appetite. This is often charged with great justice upon luxury, and surfeiting, and indolence. The highest sensual enjoyments may be experienced by those who employ both mind and body vigorously in social virtuous offices, and allow all the natural appetites to recur in their due seasons. Such certainly are the best judges of all enjoyments. Thus according to the maxim often inculca ted by Aristotle, „The good man is the true judge and standard of every thing.“

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How much inferior are the highest sensual pleasures, or even those of the imagination, or speculative knowledge, to the stable joy of conscious goodness of heart; and to that high approbation one feels of himself in any important offices for the good of his country, or his friend; and to the joyful thought of meriting well of mankind, and deserving their applauses? The kind affections alone sit easy in the heart; there is an inward complacence in them, and we joyfully entertain them for life.* But our nature is fitted for more than unactive affection. An high happiness arises from the exerting our powers; and the nobler the power is, the more beatifick is its exercise: when the virtuous efforts are successful, there is such an assemblage of pure joys from conscious goodness, sympathy with others, and the expected love and approbation of all, especially the complacency of our Maker, as far surpasses all other enjoyments. If we should fail of success, we may want the sympathetick joy, and maybe touched with compassion; but the other sources ofjoy remain: the moral enjoyments can sweeten these distresses from the misfortunes of the person or cause espoused; which without the consciousness of our hav

* This is often justly observed by Aristotle and Cicero.

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Previous to our forming just sentiments concern ing the Deity there must be a persuasion of his existence. The world has ever agreed that there must TheEvidences that there is aDeity. 169 be some superior Mind, or Minds, endued with know-Chap. 9.ledge and great power, presiding over human affairs. Tradition no doubt from race to race has contributed something to diffuse this persuasion. The experience of evil from unknown causes, the fear of them, and the desire of some further aids against them when all visible powers have failed, may have excited some to this enquiry: the natural enthusiasm and admiration arising when we behold the great and beau tiful works of nature has raised the curiosity of othersto inquire into the cause: and this probably has beenthe most general motive: but the certainty of any tenet depends not on the motives of inquiry into it, but on the validity of the proofs; and its dignity de pends upon its importance to happiness. Vanity or avarice may have excited some to the study of Geo metry; no man on this account will despise the science, or count it less certain or useful in life. We shall only point out briefly the heads of argument on this subject. The whole of natural knowledge or natural history, is a collection of evidence on this affair.

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Previous to our forming just sentiments concern ing the Deity there must be a persuasion of his existence. The world has ever agreed that there must TheEvidences that there is aDeity. 169 be some superior Mind, or Minds, endued with know-Chap. 9.ledge and great power, presiding over human affairs. Tradition no doubt from race to race has contributed something to diffuse this persuasion. The experience of evil from unknown causes, the fear of them, and the desire of some further aids against them when all visible powers have failed, may have excited some to this enquiry: the natural enthusiasm and admiration arising when we behold the great and beau tiful works of nature has raised the curiosity of othersto inquire into the cause: and this probably has beenthe most general motive: but the certainty of any tenet depends not on the motives of inquiry into it, but on the validity of the proofs; and its dignity de pends upon its importance to happiness. Vanity or avarice may have excited some to the study of Geo metry; no man on this account will despise the science, or count it less certain or useful in life. We shall only point out briefly the heads of argument on this subject. The whole of natural knowledge or natural history, is a collection of evidence on this affair.

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VI. In judging of the design of any mechanism, Proofs of good- ness from the ef- fects of Divine Power.where we tolerably understand it, we can always discern the natural intention, the proper end or effect of the 178 TheOriginal MindBook I. contrivance; and distinguish it from events which may casually ensue, or be the necessary attendants or consequents of it, tho' they are no part of the end aimed at by the contriver. The finest statue may hurt one,by falling on him: the most regular and convenient house, must obstruct the inhabitant's prospect of the heavens and the earth, more than a field does; and must put him to some trouble and expence in supporting it. By the most benign and wisely contrived course of the sun some severe weather must happen in some places. Some evils may be so essentially connected with the means of the supreme good, that Omnipotence cannot make it attainable to some beings, without them. Such evils therefore must exist in a If the design appears good and the effect a supe- riority of happi- pess.world contrived by perfect Goodness. The goodness therefore of the author of a system, in which some evils appear, may be sufficiently proved, if the natural design of the structure appears to be good and benign, and the evils only such as must ensue upon laws well calculated for superior good. This reasoning will be exceedingly confirmed if we find a great superiority of pleasure, of happiness, actually enjoyed by means of the constitution and laws established in nature. Creatures who have no immediate intuition of the Crea tor, nor a compleat knowledge of the whole plan and all its parts, can expect no better evidence; nor should they desire it.

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The pleasures of the imagination, and of know- Of imagination and sympathy.ledge, are pretty much a clear stock of good, with small deductions,* as there is scarce any pain properly opposite to them: and the pains of sympathy are over-ballanced, by the more lasting joys upon the relief of the distressed, and upon the prosperity of such as we love: not to mention the joyful approbation of the temper itself; the joyful hopes, under a good providence, for all worthy objects of our affection: and this pain we see plainly is a necessary precaution in providence, to engage us to promote the happiness of others, and defend them from evil.

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XII. How shall a being too imperfect to compre- How men of imperfect views can judge of the whole.hend the whole administration of this universe in all its parts, and all its duration, with all the connexionsof the several parts, judge concerning the presiding Mind, and his intentions? We see particular evils sometimes necessary to superior good, and therefore benignly ordered to exist. We see also some pleasures and advantages occasioning superior evils. There may therefore be other like connexions and tendencies onboth sides unknown to us. We cannot therefore pronounce of any event that it is either absolutely good, or absolutely evil, in the whole. How does a wise and dutiful child judge of its parent's affections? Or how does one in mature years judge of the intention of his physician when he is a stranger to his art? The child is sometimes restrained in its pleasures, chastised, confined to laborious exercises or studies; the patient receives nauseous potions, and feels painful operations.But the child finds the general tenor to be kind; ma- 198 TheOriginal MindBook I. ny pleasures and conveniences supplied; and a constant protection and support afforded; it has foundthe advantages arising on some occasions from re straint and discipline; it finds its powers, its knowledge, and its temper improved. The patient has found health sometimes the effect of nauseous medicines. 'Tis just thus in nature. Order, peace, health, joy, pleasure, are still prevalent in this great family, superior to all the evils we observe. Human life is universally eligible, tho' it is an unmixed state to none: wecan have no such presumptions of any interest of the Supreme Mind opposite to that of his creatures, as may lye against the intentions of the best of men. Should we not then use that equity in our conclusi ons about the Deity, that is due to our fellows, notwithstanding a few opposite appearances.

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'Tis arrogant to demand a particular account how each evil is necessary or subservient to some superior is perfectlygood. 199 good. In the best possible scheme many things mustChap. 9.be inexplicable to imperfect knowledge. The ends and connexions must be hid, as some steps in the oeconomy of the parent, or the practice of the physician must be dark to the child, or the patient. 'Tis enough that we discern the natural end to be good in all the mechanism of nature which we understand; that happiness is prevalent, and our state very eligible.All new discoveries increase our evidence by shewingthe wise purposes of what before seemed an imperfec tion. A candid mind must conclude the same to be the case of parts whose uses are yet unknown. The very anxieties of men about this grand point, help to confirm it, as they shew the natural determination of the soul to wish all well in the universe; one of the clearest footsteps of our benevolent Creator imprin ted in our own hearts. This truth must be acceptable to all, where vanity, affectation of singularity and of eminent penetration, or an humour of contradiction, hath not engrossed the heart.

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The continual power exerted in all parts of the universe, and the unlimited nature of the original Being, leads us to conceive him possest of such omnipre sence and immensity as is requisite to universal knowledge and action. And that which is original must be eternal.

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What other motive to create, but a desire to com- Goodness the spring of creati- on.municate perfection and happiness? God cannot be conceived as ultimately studious of glory from crea tures infinitely below himself. And all desire of glory must presuppose that something is previously discerned as excellent, that some determination of his nature, or some affection, is essentially the object of his approbation: and what other determination can we suppose the object of his highest approbation than perfect goodness, ever disposing him to communicate happiness. This determination must move him to display his own excellencies to his rational creatures byhis works, that thus he may be the source of the highest happiness to them, the noblest object of their contem plation and veneration, of their love, esteem, hope, and secure confidence, and the best pattern for their imi tation. God displays his perfections to make his crea tures happy in the knowledge and love of them; and not to derive new happiness to himself from their praises, or admiration.

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All the pleasures of knowledge, all the effects ofChap. 10.art and contrivance, are owing to him, who taught us more than the beasts of the field, and made us wiser than the fowls of heaven; to him we owe that we can discern the beauty and kind intention and wisdom of his works, and thus adore the footsteps of his wisdom and goodness; that we can discern moral beauty, the affections and conduct which are acceptable to him, and most resemble the Divine Beauty; that we can dis cover his perfections, and imitate them; and that we can give secure tranquillity to our souls by an entire confidence in them, and resignation to his providence. By the reason he gave us he converses with us, assures us of his good-will, gives us the most friendly admonitions; and, by the affections of esteem, love, and gratitude he has implanted, calls us to a state of friendship with himself. Thus all our happiness and excellency is from his bounty. Not unto us, Lord, not unto us, but to thy name be the praise.