31 - Johann Huart's Prüfung der Köpfe zu den Wissenschaften /
Jch wünschte, neugieriger Leser, daß ich auf eben diese Art auch mit dir verfahren könnte. Jch wollte, daß ich anfangs das Talent deines Genies entdecken und untersuchen könnte, damit ich dich, wenn es so beschaffen wäre, als es die gegenwärtige Lehre erfordert, von den gemeinen Genies absondern, und dir im Geheim solche neue und so besondre Wahrheiten entdecken könnte, als du nimmermehr geglaubt hast, daß sie einem Menschen in den Sinn kommen könnten. Da aber dieses nicht angeht, indem dieses Werk zum allgemeinen Gebrauch an das öffentliche Licht treten soll, so werde ich dich freylich nicht anders als stutzig machen können. Denn bist du eines von den gemeinen und pöbelhaften Genies, so wirst du dir, wie ich gar wohl weiß, die Meynung nicht benehmen lassen, daß schon vor langer Zeit von den Alten die Wissenschaften insgesammt erfunden und zur Vollkommenheit wären gebracht worden; und zwar aus dem seichten Grunde: weil in den Gegenständen selbst seitdem nichts neues vorgefallen sey, so könne man auch nichts mehr davon sagen, als das, was sie schon gesagt hätten. Wenn du also vielleicht diese Meynung hegen solltest, so bleib nur hier stehen, und erspare dir die Mühe weiter zu lesen; weil du nur das Mißvergnügen haben möchtest, in der Folge bewiesen zu sehen, was du für ein elendes Genie habest. Bist du aber verständig, überlegend und geduldig, so will ich dir drey vollkommen richtige Grundsätze sagen, welche wegen ihrer Neuigkeit deine Bewunderung verdienen. Der erste ist dieser: von allen verschiednen Gattungen des Genies, die unter dem menschlichen Geschlechte Statt haben können, kannst du nur eine einzige vorzüglich besitzen; dieNatur müßte denn zur Zeit, als sie dich bildete, sehr stark gewesen seyn, und alle ihre Kräfte zusammen genommen, und dir deren zwey oder drey gegeben haben; oder sie müßte ganz und gar ohnmächtig gewesen seyn, daß sie dich dumm und von allen Arten des Genies insgesammt entblößt gelassen hätte †). Derzweyte ist dieser: einer jeden Gattung desGenies ist nur eine einzige WissenfchastWissenschaft vorzüglich gemäß; so daß, wenn du nicht gleich diejenige wählest, welche sich zu deiner natürlichen Fähigkeit schickt, du es in allen übrigen zu nichts bringen wirst, wenn du auch Tag und Nacht darüber studiertest. Derdritte ist dieser: wenn du nun entdeckt hast, welche Wissenschaft deinem Genie am gemässesten sey, so ist noch eine Schwierigkeit übrig, die Schwierigkeit nämlich auszumachen, ob sich deine Fähigkeit mehr zur Theo=
†) Der Verfasser hat bey dieser Stelle die Anmerkung hinzu gesetzt, daß „in Spanien die Natur nicht mehr, als zwey, und in Griechenland nicht mehr als drey verschiedne Arten des Genies mit einander verbinden könne;“ jedoch hat er es nicht für nöthig gehalten, den Grund von seiner Grille hier anzuführen. E.
rie als zur Ausübung dieser Wissenschaft schickt; denn diese zwey sind in allen Theilen der Gelehrsamkeit einander so entgegen, und erfordern so verschiedne Genies, daß eines das andere schwächt, als ob sie in der That von ganz widriger Natur wären. Diese drey Sätze, †) ich bekenne es selbst, klingen hart: doch andre Sachen sind noch schwieriger und noch schwerer zu begreifen, die man gleichwohl nicht in Zweifel ziehen oder gar verwerfen darf. Denn da GOtt der Urheber der Natur war und sahe, daß diese, wie ich oben gesagt, dem Menschen nur eine Gattung des Genies, wegen der untereinder streitenden Beschaffenheiten derselben, geben könne; so bequemte er sich nach ihr, und theilte auch von den übernatürlichen Gnadengaben einem Menschen nicht mehr, als eine in einem hohen Grade mit.Es sind mancherley Gaben, aber es ist ein Geist. Es sind mancherley Aemter, aber es ist ein Herr. Und es sind mancherley Kräfte, aber es ist ein GOtt, der da wirket alles in allen. Jn einem jeglichen erzeigen sich die Gaben des Geistes zum gemeinen Nutz. Einem wird gegeben durch den Geist zu reden von der Weisheit, dem andern wird gegeben zu reden†) Jn den Zusätzen wird der Leser eine kurze Prüfung dieser, als Grundsätze von dem Verfasser angenommenen Meynungen finden.
E.von der Erkenntniß, nach demselbigen Geist. Einem andern der Glaube in demselbigen Geist; einem andern die Gabe gesund zu machen, in demselbigen Geist. Einem andern Wunder zu thun, einem andern Weissagung, einem andern Geister zu unterscheiden, einem andern mancherley Sprachen, einem andern die Sprachen auszulegen. Dieß aber alles wirkt derselbige einige Geist, und theilt einem jeglichen seines zu, nachdem er will. (1. Corinth. XII.)32 - Johann Huart's Prüfung der Köpfe zu den Wissenschaften /
Zu der Zeit, als die Arzneywissenschaft derAraber noch im Flor war, befand sich ein sehr berühmter Arzt unter ihnen, welcher in seinen Vorlesungen und in seinen Schriften, im Folgern, im Unterscheiden, im Widerlegen und Schliessen die größte Bewunderung verdiente. Man glaubte also, daß er wegen seiner grossen Geschicklichkeit wenigstens Todte erwecken, und allen Krankheiten ohne Unterscheid, müßte abhelfen können. Diese Vermuthung aber traf so wenig ein, daß ihm kein einziger Kranke unter die Hände kam, welchem es nicht das Leben gekostet hätte. Er selbst wurde hierüber so verdrüßlich und zornig, daß er den Mönchsstand ergriff, und sich unaufhörlich über seinen Unstern beklagte, und die wahre Ursache einsehen lernte, die ihn in der Anwendung seiner Wissenschaft so unglücklich machte.
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XII. As the order, grandeur, regular dispositions Religion natural.and motions, of the visible world, must soon affect the mind with admiration; as the several classes of animals and vegetables display in their whole frame exquisite mechanism, and regular structure, evidencing counsel, art, and contrivance for certain ends; men of genius and attention must soon discover some intelligent beings, one or more, presiding in all this comely order and magnificence. The great and the beautiful strikes the mind with veneration, and leads us to infer intelligence as residing in it, or directing it: a careful attention to the structure of our own natureand its powers leads to the same conclusion. Our feeling moral sentiments, our sense of goodness and virtue, as well as of art and design; our experience of 36 Mankind Social andReligious.Book I. some moral distribution within, by immediate happi ness or misery constantly attending virtue and vice, and of a like distribution generally obtaining even in external things by a natural tendency, must suggest thatthere is a moral government in the world: and as men are prone to communicate their knowledge, in ventions, conjectures, the notions of a Deity and providence must soon be diffused; and an easy exercise of reason would confirm the persuasion. Thus some de votion and piety would generally obtain, and therefore may justly be called natural to a rational system. An early revelation and tradition generally anticipated human invention in this matter: but these alone could scarce have diffused the belief so universally, without the aids of obvious reasons from strong ap pearances in Nature. Notions of Deity and some sort of worship have in fact as universally obtained among men, as living in society, the use of speech, or even propagating their kind; and thus may be counted as natural.
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Again - - - - Tho' the approbation of moral excellence nor pleasing our moral sense.is a grateful action or sensation of the mind, 'tis plainthe good approved is not this tendency to give us a 54 The trueNotion ofMoral Excellence.Book I. grateful sensation. As, in approving a beautiful form, we refer the beauty to the object; we do not say that it is beautiful because we reap some little pleasure in viewing it, but we are pleased in viewing it because it is antecedently beautiful. Thus, when we admire the virtue of another, the whole excellence, or that quali ty which by nature we are determined to approve, is conceived to be in that other; we are pleased in the contemplation because the object is excellent, and the object is not judged to be therefore excellent because it gives us pleasure.
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Can that be deemed the sole ultimate determination, the sole ultimate end, which the mind in the exercise of its noblest powers can calmly resolve, with inward approbation, deliberately to counteract? are there not instances of men who have voluntarily sacrificed their lives, without thinking of any other state of existence, for the sake of their friends or their country? does not every heart approve this temper and conduct, and admire it the more, the less presumpti on there is of the love of glory and postumous fame, or of any sublimer private interest mixing itself with the generous affection? does not the admiration rise higher, the more deliberately such resolutions are formed and executed? all this is unquestionably true, and yet would be absurd and impossible if self-interest of any kind is the sole ultimate termination of all theSupreme Principle. 77 calm desire. There is therefore another ultimate de-Chap. 4.termination which our souls are capable of, destined to be also an original spring of the calmest and most deliberate purposes of action; a desire of communicatinghappiness, an ultimate good-will, not referred to anyprivate interest, and often operating without such reference.
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And then, surely, this notion of my own temper and conduct as beneficial to others can upon their scheme have nothing immediately grateful to me. These cool uncertain prospects of returns of advantage from the selfish arts of others can have nothing alluring amidst certain expences, labours, wounds, and death? whence the ardour for a surviving fame? this is all monstrous and unnatural. Is all our admiration, our high zeal for the brave, and merciful, and generous, and mag nanimous, all our ambition and ardour for glory, this cool traffick, this artful barter of advantageous services without an express bargain? We appeal to every human heart in this matter; to the hearts of the young, who are most ardent in praising, and most delighted with praise; and have little felt those artful 82 TheSense ofHonourBook I. mean designs of interest. Is all esteem and honour a mere cool opinion that from some actions and affections we shall reap some advantage? Is all the confounding sense of shame, and blushing, only a fear ofsome future uncertain losses, which we know not wellwhat they shall be, or how they will befal us? Are not men conscious of their own designs in the pursuits of honour; of their own apprehensions in their avoiding of what is shameful; and of the occasion of their sorrow when they are ashamed? surely these artful views of our own interest could not be unknown to us.
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The chief pleasures of history and poetry, and the powers of eloquence are derived from the same sources. History, as it represents the moral characters and fortunes of the great and of nations, is always exercising our moral faculty, and our social feelings of the fortunes of others. Poetry entertains us in a way yet more affecting, by more striking representations of the same objects in fictitious characters, and moving our terror, and com passion, and moral admiration. The power of the orator consists in moving our approbation or condemnation, and the ensuing affections of esteem or indignation, by presenting fully all the moral qualities of actions and characters, all the pityable circumstances which may extenuate or excuse, to engage our favour; or all the aggravating ones, to encrease our indignation; displaying all the high colours on both sides, as be is either praising or making invectives.
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A full persuasion of the excellence and importance of virtue above all other enjoyments, provided we have just notions of it, must always be for our interest.The opinion will stand the test of the strictest inquiry, as we shall shew hereafter; and the enjoyment is in our power. But disproportioned admirations of some sorts of virtue of a limited nature, and of some inferior moral forms, such as mere fortitude, zeal for truth, and for a particular system of religious tenets, while the nobler forms of goodness of more extensive good influence are overlooked, may lead men into very bad affections, and into horrid actions. No natural sense or desire is without its use, while our opinions are true: but when they are false, some of thebest affections or senses may be pernicious. Our moral sense and kind affections lead us to condemn the evil, to oppose their designs; nay to wish their destruction when they are conceived to be unalterably set upon the ruin of others better than themselves. These ve- experienced by all. 109 ry principles, along with the anger and indignationChap. 6.naturally arising against what appears evil, may lead us into a settled rancour and hatred against great bodies of mankind thus falsely represented as wicked, and make us appear to them, as they appear to us, maliciously set upon the destruction of others.
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Superior beings by diviner faculties and fuller know-Chap. 7.ledge may, without experience of all sorts, immedi- What men are the best judges.ately discern what are the noblest. They may have some intuitive knowledge of perfection, and some standard of it, which may make the experience of some lower sorts useless to them. But of mankind these certainly are the best judges who have full experience, with their tastes or senses and appetites in a natural vigorous state. Now it never was alledged that social affections, the admiration of moral excellence, the desire of esteem, with their attendant and guardian tem perance, the pursuits of knowledge, or a natural activity, impaired any sense or appetite. This is often charged with great justice upon luxury, and surfeiting, and indolence. The highest sensual enjoyments may be experienced by those who employ both mind and body vigorously in social virtuous offices, and allow all the natural appetites to recur in their due seasons. Such certainly are the best judges of all enjoyments. Thus according to the maxim often inculca ted by Aristotle, „The good man is the true judge and standard of every thing.“
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Unexamined admirations of some partial moral Just notions of virtue necessary.forms, and some narrow affections, without true notions of merit in persons and causes, may lead us into such conduct as upon better information may be matter of shame and remorse. But where by close reflection we have attained just notions of virtue and merit, and of the effectual means of doing good, virtuous action, as it is the natural purpose of a rational and 134 AComparison ofBook I. social species, so it is their highest happiness, and always in their power.
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XIV. Our higher senses by which we receive the By the imagi- nation we receive more pleasure than pain.pleasures of the imagination, admit far less pain than pleasure, if the mind is under good discipline. Bodily deformity or distortion may be very uneasy to the per
* On this subject many noble sentiments are to be sound in Cicero's Tusculan. l. ii.
144 AComparison of theBook I. son who is so unfortunate; and so may meanness, or the want of the decencies and elegancies of life, to such as have high desires and notions of happiness in such things. But there is no uneasy craving, as in the appetites, previous to these imaginations of great good in the objects; and the correcting of these imaginations may remove all the pain, especially where nobler enjoyments compensate the want of these pleasures. And then beauty, harmony, and ingenious works of art, and true imitation of every kind, without any property in the external objects, give pretty high positivepleasures; whereas the deformity of external objects,dissonance, bad imitations, or rude works of art, giveno other pain than that trifling sort from a disappointment of expectation in a matter of no necessity in life. Knowledge is attended with exquisite pleasure; butthe want of it only occasions pain where there is an high desire and admiration of it, or a fear of shamefor the want of it. The uneasiness even to an inflamedimagination from the want of the grandeur and elegance of life is generally lighter than bodily pain, or the sympathetick, or the sense of moral turpitude and infamy; and 'tis wise and just that it should be so, as these other senses are intended to guard mankind against evils more pernicious to the system. If men ex pose sometimes their friends, families, and country, to many evils by immoderate expences on grandeur and elegance; the distant miseries of others are unexpected, or not attended to: there are hopes of new friends, of support, of profitable employments by the several Sorts ofPain. 145 friendship of the great, the approaching evils are notChap. 7.apprehended, and the guilt is unobserved.42 - /
Previous to our forming just sentiments concern ing the Deity there must be a persuasion of his existence. The world has ever agreed that there must TheEvidences that there is aDeity. 169 be some superior Mind, or Minds, endued with know-Chap. 9.ledge and great power, presiding over human affairs. Tradition no doubt from race to race has contributed something to diffuse this persuasion. The experience of evil from unknown causes, the fear of them, and the desire of some further aids against them when all visible powers have failed, may have excited some to this enquiry: the natural enthusiasm and admiration arising when we behold the great and beau tiful works of nature has raised the curiosity of othersto inquire into the cause: and this probably has beenthe most general motive: but the certainty of any tenet depends not on the motives of inquiry into it, but on the validity of the proofs; and its dignity de pends upon its importance to happiness. Vanity or avarice may have excited some to the study of Geo metry; no man on this account will despise the science, or count it less certain or useful in life. We shall only point out briefly the heads of argument on this subject. The whole of natural knowledge or natural history, is a collection of evidence on this affair.
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We have dwelt long on this head, rather pointing out the sources of evidence than displaying it fully, because the ascertaining the goodness of God is the grand foundation of our happiness and the main pillar of virtue. We shall briefly touch at his other attributes, least any mistakes about them should abate that high veneration and admiration due to his excellency.
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In this matter, as much as any, our moral faculty This known by the moral sense.is of the highest use. It not only points out the affections suited to these perfections, but sacredly recommends and enjoins them as absolutely necessary to a good character; and as much condemns the want of them, as of any affections toward our fellow-creatures. Nay points them out as of more sacred obliga tion. The moral faculty itself seems that peculiar part of our nature most adapted to promote this correspondence of every rational mind with the greatSource of our being and of all perfection, as it immediately approves all moral excellence, and determines 210 TheWorship dueBook I. the soul to the love of it, and approves this love as the greatest excellence of mind; which too is the most useful in the system, since the admiration and love of moral perfection is a natural incitement to all goodoffices.
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IV. External worship is the natural expression of The reasons for external wor- ship.these devout sentiments and affections. The obvious reasons for it are these; the exercise and expression of all sentiments and affections makes their impressionsdeeper, and strengthens them in the soul. Again; gratitude, love and esteem, are affections which decline concealment when they are lively; we are naturally prone to express them, even tho' they give no new happiness to their object. 'Tis plainly our duty to promote virtue and happiness among others: our worshipping in society, our recounting thankfully God's benefits, our explaining his nature and perfecti ons, our expressing our admiration, esteem, gratitude, and love, presents to the minds of others the proper 218 TheWorship dueBook I. motives of like affections; and by a contagion, obser vable in all our passions, naturally tends to raise them in others. Piety thus diffused in a society, is the strong est restraint from evil; and adds new force to every social disposition, to every engagement to good offices.