46 - /
Some very good judges may think, and perhaps not without reason, that by any thing yet said, justice has not been done to Dr. Hutcheson's character as an author: „That he has been represented only as en quiring into the mind of man as a moral constitution, and asserting a distinct order of affections in it terminating ultimately on the good of others, and a Moral Sense, by which we instantaneously perceive a certain set of affections, characters, and actionsas good, and a contrary one as bad; all which is commonly done by that whole order of Philosophers who agree with him in admitting generous princi ples in human nature: whereas he justly deserves to be exhibited to the public in the light of an original, original in the most capital of all articles relative to the science of human nature and morality: PREFACE.xlv „for tho all the disciples of the generous philosophyassert, in the strongest manner, a distinct order of affections in our nature, having the happiness of others for their ultimate object, yet when the agent is put upon determining the most important measure of human conduct, Why am I to gratify this present desire? or why should I rather chuse to controul it in favour of another? the anser which this order of philosophers has given, is very different from that which is and must be given by Dr. Hutcheson: according to the former the agent is referred to the consideration of his personal happiness*(arising indeed from the prevalence of virtuous affections) as the determiner of his choice; taking it for granted, that there can be but one ultimate end of the agent's cool and deliberate pursuit, viz. his own highest interest or personal happiness: but Dr. Hutcheson's doctrine is far otherways; according to him, there are three calm determinations in our nature, namely, the calm desire of our own happiness, the calm desire of the happiness of other beings, and the calm desire of moral perfection,
* Shaft. Inq. from p. 77 to 174, and p. 69 middle sect. Lond. Ed.
xlvi PREFACE. „each of them alike ultimate; that betwixt the second and third determination there can scarce happen any opposition, but that it is quite otherwise betwixt the first and the other two, where an apparent opposition at least may often fall out, and in all such cases it is so far from being intended by the constitution of our nature, that the desire of private happiness should controul the other desires, that the Moral Sense never fails to dictate to the agent the voluntary sacrifice of the first, to either of the other two †: the whole is a question of fact, and every one must judge of it for himself: but the difference is the greatest imaginable, whether the desire of moral excellence, or the desire of private happiness is destined to be the supreme controuling principle according to the actual constitution of our na ture: and none of the Philosophers before our Author has ever hinted at such a representation of our nature as pleads for the former as the just account of the matter: nature has formed the union between the latter two of the three great ultimate de terminations of the human mind; but it is religion† Book I. chap. iv. § 12. of this work.
PREFACE.xlvii „alone, according to him, that can render all the three invariably harmonious, and incapable of acting in different and opposite directions.“47 - /
Some very good judges may think, and perhaps not without reason, that by any thing yet said, justice has not been done to Dr. Hutcheson's character as an author: „That he has been represented only as en quiring into the mind of man as a moral constitution, and asserting a distinct order of affections in it terminating ultimately on the good of others, and a Moral Sense, by which we instantaneously perceive a certain set of affections, characters, and actionsas good, and a contrary one as bad; all which is commonly done by that whole order of Philosophers who agree with him in admitting generous princi ples in human nature: whereas he justly deserves to be exhibited to the public in the light of an original, original in the most capital of all articles relative to the science of human nature and morality: PREFACE.xlv „for tho all the disciples of the generous philosophyassert, in the strongest manner, a distinct order of affections in our nature, having the happiness of others for their ultimate object, yet when the agent is put upon determining the most important measure of human conduct, Why am I to gratify this present desire? or why should I rather chuse to controul it in favour of another? the anser which this order of philosophers has given, is very different from that which is and must be given by Dr. Hutcheson: according to the former the agent is referred to the consideration of his personal happiness*(arising indeed from the prevalence of virtuous affections) as the determiner of his choice; taking it for granted, that there can be but one ultimate end of the agent's cool and deliberate pursuit, viz. his own highest interest or personal happiness: but Dr. Hutcheson's doctrine is far otherways; according to him, there are three calm determinations in our nature, namely, the calm desire of our own happiness, the calm desire of the happiness of other beings, and the calm desire of moral perfection,
* Shaft. Inq. from p. 77 to 174, and p. 69 middle sect. Lond. Ed.
xlvi PREFACE. „each of them alike ultimate; that betwixt the second and third determination there can scarce happen any opposition, but that it is quite otherwise betwixt the first and the other two, where an apparent opposition at least may often fall out, and in all such cases it is so far from being intended by the constitution of our nature, that the desire of private happiness should controul the other desires, that the Moral Sense never fails to dictate to the agent the voluntary sacrifice of the first, to either of the other two †: the whole is a question of fact, and every one must judge of it for himself: but the difference is the greatest imaginable, whether the desire of moral excellence, or the desire of private happiness is destined to be the supreme controuling principle according to the actual constitution of our na ture: and none of the Philosophers before our Author has ever hinted at such a representation of our nature as pleads for the former as the just account of the matter: nature has formed the union between the latter two of the three great ultimate de terminations of the human mind; but it is religion† Book I. chap. iv. § 12. of this work.
PREFACE.xlvii „alone, according to him, that can render all the three invariably harmonious, and incapable of acting in different and opposite directions.“48 - /
It may be acknowledged that Dr. Hutcheson has taught this doctrine more fully and explicitly than any of the Philosophers either antient or modern ‡; but that none of them have ever hinted at it, tho' it should be so, cannot well be positively asserted without a very extensive, and at the same time a very particular survey of their works. Our Author has indeed made no pretensions to new discoveries, but rather expressly disclaimed them*: but this may be owing to the particular modesty of his genius and disposition: it was probably owing, in some degree, to this amiable turn of mind, that he chused to consider mo rals rather in the humbler way of a matter of fact, than in the more pompous one of scientifical knowledge: and this too made him always more solicitous that his doctrine should in the main coincide with that of other good Moralists, than that it should be different or opposite: thus he endeavoured to shew,
‡ Book I. chap. iv. § 12. of this work.
* Pref. to Essay on the Pass. p. 18 and 19.
xlviii PREFACE. that once admitting the generous affections into human nature and the Moral Sense, the doctrine of the eternal fitness and unfitness of things, and of immutable moral truths was very just and solid. But it is time to leave the candid reader to the perusal of the Work itself, and to form such judgments of the Author's doctrine in all respects, as upon serious examination shall appear to him to be well founded.49 - /
It may be acknowledged that Dr. Hutcheson has taught this doctrine more fully and explicitly than any of the Philosophers either antient or modern ‡; but that none of them have ever hinted at it, tho' it should be so, cannot well be positively asserted without a very extensive, and at the same time a very particular survey of their works. Our Author has indeed made no pretensions to new discoveries, but rather expressly disclaimed them*: but this may be owing to the particular modesty of his genius and disposition: it was probably owing, in some degree, to this amiable turn of mind, that he chused to consider mo rals rather in the humbler way of a matter of fact, than in the more pompous one of scientifical knowledge: and this too made him always more solicitous that his doctrine should in the main coincide with that of other good Moralists, than that it should be different or opposite: thus he endeavoured to shew,
‡ Book I. chap. iv. § 12. of this work.
* Pref. to Essay on the Pass. p. 18 and 19.
xlviii PREFACE. that once admitting the generous affections into human nature and the Moral Sense, the doctrine of the eternal fitness and unfitness of things, and of immutable moral truths was very just and solid. But it is time to leave the candid reader to the perusal of the Work itself, and to form such judgments of the Author's doctrine in all respects, as upon serious examination shall appear to him to be well founded.56 - /
Doctor Franz Hutcheson war den 8 August 1694. gebohren. Sein Vater, Herr Johann Hut cheson, war Prediger bey einer presbyteriani schen Gemeinde im nördlichen Theile von Jrrland. Er hatte den Ruhm eines vernünftigen, gelehrten, from men und tugendhaften Mannes. Sein Sohn, Franz, wurde im achten Jahr seines Alters, nebst seinem äl tern Bruder, der Aufsicht und Anführung ihres Gros vaters, Herr Alexander Hutchesons, anvertrauet, wel cher ebenfalls ein würdiger presbyterianischer Geistlicher in demselben Theile von Jrrland, aber aus Schottland gebürtig war. Er war der zweyte Sohn einer alten und angesehenen Familie in der Grafschaft Ayr in die sem Königreiche.
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Doctor Franz Hutcheson war den 8 August 1694. gebohren. Sein Vater, Herr Johann Hut cheson, war Prediger bey einer presbyteriani schen Gemeinde im nördlichen Theile von Jrrland. Er hatte den Ruhm eines vernünftigen, gelehrten, from men und tugendhaften Mannes. Sein Sohn, Franz, wurde im achten Jahr seines Alters, nebst seinem äl tern Bruder, der Aufsicht und Anführung ihres Gros vaters, Herr Alexander Hutchesons, anvertrauet, wel cher ebenfalls ein würdiger presbyterianischer Geistlicher in demselben Theile von Jrrland, aber aus Schottland gebürtig war. Er war der zweyte Sohn einer alten und angesehenen Familie in der Grafschaft Ayr in die sem Königreiche.
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Franz verrieth gar bald eine ausserordeutliche Fähigkeit, eine ungemeine Wissensbegierde und die vor trefflichste Gemüthsbeschaffenheit. Die sonderbare Menschenliebe und Uneigennützigkeit, durch welche er, sein ganzes Leben hindurch, sich unterschied, zeigte sich schon in seiner frühesten Jugend bey verschiedenen Gele genheiten. Sein unschuldiges und sanftes Betragen, seine große Fähigkeit und sein besonderer Fleis verschaff2 Vorrede.ten ihm bald die vorzüglichste Zuneigung seines Grosva ters. Aber seine Liebe zu seinem Bruder war so gros, daß er über die Zärtlichkeit seines Grosvaters keine Freude empfand, weil sein Bruder nicht einen glei chen Antheil daran hatte. Der Vorzug, welcher ihm gegeben wurde, verursachte ihm so gar eine wahre Be kümmernis, und er wendete alle Mittel und alle nur mögliche unschuldige Kunstgriffe an, es dahin zu brin gen, daß sein Bruder die Liebe seines Grosvaters eben so sehr zu verdienen scheinen möchte. Und da sein Grosvater in seinem letzten Willen eine ehemalige Ein richtung seiner Familiensachen, zu seinem Vortheil, geändert hatte: so konten seine Anverwandten ihn durch keine Gründe bewegen, es anzunehmen, sondern er schlug es schlechterdings aus, und bestand darauf, daß es bey der ersten Einrichtung bleiben müsse. Diese und viele andere Beyspiele von gleicher Art, welche angeführt werden könten, liessen seine ausserordentliche Uneigen nützigkeit in reifern Jahren vorhersehen.
59 - /
Franz verrieth gar bald eine ausserordeutliche Fähigkeit, eine ungemeine Wissensbegierde und die vor trefflichste Gemüthsbeschaffenheit. Die sonderbare Menschenliebe und Uneigennützigkeit, durch welche er, sein ganzes Leben hindurch, sich unterschied, zeigte sich schon in seiner frühesten Jugend bey verschiedenen Gele genheiten. Sein unschuldiges und sanftes Betragen, seine große Fähigkeit und sein besonderer Fleis verschaff2 Vorrede.ten ihm bald die vorzüglichste Zuneigung seines Grosva ters. Aber seine Liebe zu seinem Bruder war so gros, daß er über die Zärtlichkeit seines Grosvaters keine Freude empfand, weil sein Bruder nicht einen glei chen Antheil daran hatte. Der Vorzug, welcher ihm gegeben wurde, verursachte ihm so gar eine wahre Be kümmernis, und er wendete alle Mittel und alle nur mögliche unschuldige Kunstgriffe an, es dahin zu brin gen, daß sein Bruder die Liebe seines Grosvaters eben so sehr zu verdienen scheinen möchte. Und da sein Grosvater in seinem letzten Willen eine ehemalige Ein richtung seiner Familiensachen, zu seinem Vortheil, geändert hatte: so konten seine Anverwandten ihn durch keine Gründe bewegen, es anzunehmen, sondern er schlug es schlechterdings aus, und bestand darauf, daß es bey der ersten Einrichtung bleiben müsse. Diese und viele andere Beyspiele von gleicher Art, welche angeführt werden könten, liessen seine ausserordentliche Uneigen nützigkeit in reifern Jahren vorhersehen.
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Nachdem er die Anfangsgründe der Wissenschaf ten erlernt hatte, wurde er auf eine von seinen Anver wandten etwas entlegene Akademie geschickt, um sich mit der Weltweisheit bekant zu machen. Er wurde daselbst in der ordentlichen scholastischen Philosophie unterwiesen, welche damals in Ansehen stand, und auf welche er sich mit einem mehr als gewöhnlichem Eifer und Fleis se legte.